The Dative in Ṛgvedic Sanskrit

A Semantic Map Analysis

John De-Schai Olsen

Master's thesis in Sanskrit

Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

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Summary

This thesis uses a semantic map model to describe the dative case in Ṛgvedic Sanskrit. A semantic map is a way to visualize the relationships between the various functions of a linguistic form. The maps come about through cross-linguistic comparison and they aim for universality. By looking at comparable linguistic forms in at least a dozen genetically diverse languages, one should arrive at a map that is universally valid. This map should be able to explain the use of a linguistic form in any language, how its various functions relate to each other and predict the path of semantic change when that takes place. A semantic map for the dative function has already been made, and I will test this map against data from the Ṛgveda.

My conclusion will be that the data confirm rather than invalidate the map, and that the map adequately describes the Ṛgvedic state of affairs. I will also argue that the map is not just ordered in a way as to satisfy typological tendencies, but that the design of the map is sensitive to semantic and pragmatic concerns.

Acknowledgements

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A special thanks goes to Eystein Dahl, my co-supervisor, without whose support and advice this thesis would never have been realized.

I take the full responsibility alone for all misanalyses, unsound decisions, bad language and other shortcomings in this thesis.

Table of contents

1 Introduction

The aim of this project is to look at how well suited a Semantic Map model is for describing the use of the dative case in Ṛgvedic Sanskrit. Traditionally, cases in Sanskrit have been described by listing their various uses, with few attempts at explaining how the various uses are related to each other (e.g. Delbrück 1888). Many of the most thorough descriptions of the dative in Sanskrit are also rather old (cf. Hopkins 1906)[1]. In this thesis I will try to describe the relationships between the different uses of the dative case in Sanskrit by using a relatively recent model, the Semantic Map model.

I will use data from the Ṛgveda, which represents the oldest preserved stage of the Sanskrit language (c. 1500-1000 BCE), and which also represents one of the oldest examples of any Indo-European language. I will try to plot the data onto a Semantic Map, based on an already existing map for the dative function which Martin Haspelmath has made (see figure 1.1 below) on the basis of a dozen genetically different languages. The map is meant to be universal, and one objective is therefore to test the suitability and predictive power of this map for the dative functions in Sanskrit.

(1) Conceptual Space for the Dative
(Adapted from Haspelmath 2003: 213)



Figure 1.1 – Haspelmath's semantic map for the dative (in Sugawara 2005:117)

I will conclude that the data from Sanskrit present no challenge to the claim for universality made by Haspelmath's dative map, as far as the criteria for how to test the universality of a map go. But a caution will be made as the verses in the Ṛgveda were composed over several centuries, and that Ṛgvedic Sanskrit therefore does not strictly represent a synchronic stage of the Sanskrit language. Also, the scant availability of Bronze

[1] although some are newer, for instance Haudry (1977).
[2] or some version of old Indo-Aryan at least

Age Aryans these days puts me at the mercy of translators, Victorian philologists and my own judgement and prejudices.

I will also look at which other cases and constructions 'compete' in expressing the functions of the dative. Since it is known that the inherited dative is used less in later stages of Sanskrit and Middle Indo-Aryan, one goal is to find out whether this development could be explained. How can a Semantic Map model assist in understanding such a development? How well do the predicitions which are built into the Semantic Map correspond with the Sanskrit data? More generally, how well suited is a Semantic Map model for historical and diachronic linguistics?

The thesis will be organized as follows:

In **chapter 2** I will give a brief introduction to Sanskrit and the Ṛgveda.

In **chapter 3** I will present the Semantic Map model.

In **chapter 4** I will introduce the terminology used in analyzing the dative in the Ṛgveda.

In **chapter 5** I will look at the morphology of the dative in Sanskrit and discuss earlier works on the topic.

Chapter 6 will be the most important chapter, where I present the various uses of the dative in the Ṛgveda, progressively filling out the semantic map.

In **chapter 7** I will look at whether it is possible to find a Gesamtbedeutung for the dative in Sanskrit by looking at causal order and Figure/Ground relationships.

In **chapter 8** I will discuss constructions competing with the dative in Sanskrit and suggest how a semantic map can be used in explaining the later demise of the dative.

In **chapter 9** I will present the conclusion.

2 Sanskrit and the Ṛgveda

Sanskrit belongs to the Indo-Iranian branch of the Indo-European language family, more specifically it belongs to the Indo-Aryan subbranch of Indo-Iranian. Vedic Sanskrit refers to the language of the *Ṛgveda* and the other Vedas, the *Sāmaveda*, the *Yajurveda* and the *Atharvaveda*.

The classical period of the Sanskrit language begins in about the fifth century BCE, when the grammarian Pāṇini codified the rules for Sanskrit in his proto-generative work *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, which has been referred as the most advanced linguistic analysis made before the establishment of modern linguistics in the twentieth century (Fortson 2010:208). We will briefly touch upon his work in this thesis (section 5.4).

Sanskrit[2] developed into Middle Indo-Aryan languages, also called Prakrits, such as Pāḷi, the language of the Theravāda Buddhist canon, and Ardhamāgadhī, the language of the Jain canon. Examples of Modern Indo-Aryan languages are Hindi-Urdu, Bengali, Nepali, Panjabi and Gujarati.

The Ṛgveda is the oldest preserved example of Sanskrit literature. It was composed roughly between 1500 and 1000 BCE (Mallory and Adams 1997:304)[3], probably in the Panjab region (Witzel 2001:5), and has been preserved through oral transmission. The Ṛgveda is the only Sanskrit text that I will use as a basis for my description of the dative in Sanskrit. But even though I will only be dealing with one text, the very fact that the Ṛgveda was written over a period of several centuries, by different authors, means that we are facing a text in which there will be some degree of linguistic variation and the 'Ṛgvedic' language is therefore not strictly synchronic. I will nevertheless not try to divide the Ṛgvedic language into different periods, but rather treat it as though it were synchronic.

Sanskrit is an ancient and dead language. Dead, but not extinct, as someone put it[4]. 'Not extinct' in the sense that we have ample documentation of it, we know a lot about it and at least we think we understand a lot of it. There is probably no other language older than Sanskrit that is so well-preserved. With its extensive vocabulary and well-described grammar, I think it is a legitimate object of study for finding out more about Language with capital 'l', that is, the structure upon which all languages are built, which has become the main goal of

[2] or some version of old Indo-Aryan at least
[3] It is difficult do date the Ṛgveda precisely. Witzel (2001:5) argues that it must be later than the disintegration of the Indus cities in Panjab in c. 1900 BCE, but before the introduction of iron into the region c. 1200-1000 BCE.
[4] I can't remember who!

linguistics. I think a study of a language removed far from us in time could be just as insightful as a study of a language removed far from us in geography.

3 Semantic maps

3.1 Introduction

A semantic map is a way to visualize the relationships between the different grammatical functions of a linguistic form (Narrog and van der Auwera, n.d.). It is a relatively new endeavour, with Lloyd B. Anderson's maps of the perfect category from 1982 usually being regarded as the first examples of semantic maps. Since then, and especially since the late 1990s, the use of this model has been ever growing, and semantic maps have been proposed for categories such as evidentiality, voice, modality, indefiniteness, as well as case (Narrog and van der Auwera, n.d., de Haan 2004:2). Though semantic maps can be made both for content words and grammatical morphemes, they are primarily made for the latter, since grammatical morphemes, with their more abstract meanings, are more prone to multifunctionality (Haspelmath 2000:1).

In different studies employing semantic maps, there are significant differences, both in terms of the geometry of the maps, as well as in the terminology being used (de Haan 2004:2). Semantic maps have also been called 'mental maps', 'cognitive maps', and 'implicational maps' (Haspelmath 2000:8). I will use the term 'semantic map' and will explain below how such a map is built up.

In this thesis we will look at the various functions of the dative in Sanskrit, and the relationships between the functions. A semantic map for the dative category has already been made (Haspelmath 1999), so we will not have to construct a new map. And since semantic maps aim for universality, we will look into how well this map describes the situation in Sanskrit.

3.2 Polysemy vs. monosemy

There are various ways to look at the relationships between the different uses of one and the same linguistic form. A common way to look at it is in terms of polysemy versus monosemy (also referred to as 'vagueness'). If a morpheme is polysemic, it has several distinct senses. If a morpheme is said to be monosemic, on the other hand, it has one vague, and rather abstract

meaning, whose various uses can be distinguished by looking at the contexts in which the morphemes appear (Haspelmath 2000:2). For example, the word COUSIN can refer to both a male or a female child of one's aunt or uncle. It is simply vague with respect to gender, and for most speakers it probably does not have distinct 'male cousin' and 'female cousin' senses (Koskela and Murphy 2006:742).

Many devices have been proposed to differentiate polysemy from monosemy, but with semantic maps, one simply stays neutral to the whole debate. The functions of a grammatical morpheme (represented by points or labels on the map) are linked (represented by lines) and constitute an ordered network, but it is unclear whether these functions represent different conventional meanings of the morpheme or simply a contextually dependent use of it (Haspelmath 2000:2-3).



Figure 3.1, Haspelmath's Indefiniteness Map in Zwarts (2010:377)

The question of whether to represent two different instances of a grammatical morpheme as two separate functions on the map, or whether to lump them together under one function, usually depends on cross-linguistic comparison. If no language uses two different morphemes to express two closely related concepts or situations, there is no basis to distinguish them on a semantic map. If a language does use two different morphemes however, then one sets up two separate functions on the map, even when used for describing languages that do not formally make such a distinction, since a semantic map is supposed to be a visualization of the way in which the linguistic form in one language maps onto a larger, universal conceptual space, which is claimed to be common to all languages.

As an example, let us look at the English preposition TO, and the Norwegian preposition TIL, both of which share many of the same 'dative'-like functions, but are not always equivalent. Both are used to express 'direction': *She walked to the beac*h and *Ho gjekk til stranda*. Both are used to express 'recipient': *He gave the key to his neighbour*. *Han gav nøkkelen til grannen sin*. But only English uses TO to express 'purpose', Norwegian uses

(FOR) Å: *I went out to buy cat food*. *Eg drog (for å/*til) kjøpe kattemat*. Norwegian, on the other hand, uses *til* to express 'possession', whereas this is not possible with English TO: *boka til læraren*, *the book *to the teacher*.

On the basis of these few examples, we can set up a semantic map that includes a point each for 'purpose' and 'possession', but we have nothing that could distinguish the 'direction' function from the 'recipient' function, since neither English nor Norwegian distinguish them formally. Still, of course, there are other languages which do make such a distinction, forcing us to represent them separately on the map, something Haspelmath indeed does on his Dative map.

Caution: accidental homonymy

For two formally identical elements to be regarded as two different functions of the same grammatical morpheme, their meanings have to be similar. This excludes cases where two elements just happen to have the same form. For example, the word BANK could mean either 'organization providing financial services', or 'the side of a river'. These two meanings do not have anything in common, and historically they have separate origins. Their accidental homonymy means that they will not form part of the same semantic map.

In Sanskrit, some of the dative morphemes are identical in form to the morphemes of other cases within the same paradigm (i.e. there is syncretism). The dative plural ending *–bhyas* is identical to the ablative plural ending, while the dative dual ending *–bhyām* has the same form as both the ablative and instrumental dual endings. Whether this syncretism is the result of phonological changes rendering once separate affixes homonymous is unknown. The plural endings were apparently syncretic already in Proto-Indo-European (Fortson 2010:126), while the dual endings in question cannot be securely reconstructed (ibid. 128). But from what we shall see later (in chapter 6), it appears that the case most frequently used as an alternative to the dative is the accusative, a case with which the dative is not syncretic, except for with the clictic pronouns[5]. Therefore it seems that the functions of the instrumental and ablative affixes should be represented on different maps from the functions of the dative – there is no overlap of functions despite confluence of form. In any case, the fact that we have a separate dative morpheme in the singular means that there is no reason to call the existence of a distinct dative case in Sanskrit into doubt.

[5] For instance, the first person plural pronoun has the clitic form *nas* 'us', which could function as accusative, dative and genitive.

3.3 Cross-linguistic comparison and distinguishing functions

At the heart of making a semantic map is cross-linguistic comparison. It is through comparing the functions of a linguistic form in different languages that the semantic map takes shape. First one gathers examples of the uses of one specific linguistic form in one language and classify them according to function. How fine-grained the analysis should be and how many classes one should distinguish is always a difficult question. One could lump or split. The semantic map method responds to this question in a different way. The response is to add data from more languages. First one must find comparable linguistic forms in the languages that one is adding. When the data is added and one has compared the forms, one will see that the forms in different languages often do not cover the exact same functions. It is this overlap/non-overlap which marks out the border between different functions on a map, so that semantic mapping follows this principle: something is regarded as a function separate from another function only if there is at least one language in which those functions are expressed through two different forms. For example, there is no language (cf. Haspelmath 1999) which uses separate morphemes to express the recipient and addressee functions, and therefore a semantic map will not distinguish between them, even though it is fully possible for us to make such a distinction. A maker of semantic maps does not have to spend much time making decisions as to what distinctions to put on the map – they emerge from the cross-linguistic comparison.

3.4 Arrangement of functions and universality

When arranging the functions on a map, one places similar functions closer together. Degree of similarity should be reflected in spatial distance (Zwarts 2010:377). Then this arrangement is to be checked against new data. The functions should be arranged in a way so that the functions will cover a contiguous area on the map in all the languages one has surveyed (Haspelmath 1999:128). A map in which the functions are not contiguous is not an acceptable map.



Figure 3.2. This is an acceptable map. Functions C, D, E, and G (shaded) cover a contiguous area on the map.



Figure 3.3. This is an unacceptable map. Functions A, B, and C are not connected to function E. The morpheme in question should have expressed function D as well.

This rule of semantic map making forms the basis of the Semantic Map Connectivity Hypothesis (Croft 2010:54): ‘a possible linguistic category is constrained to be connected in the conceptual space’.

Cross-linguistic comparison shows that the range of functions associated with a single linguistic form tends to be similar from language to language. This could indicate that the arrangement of functions are based on a universally valid pattern, which is part of a speaker’s mental representation (Cristofaro 2010:1). This arrangement, which is independent of individual languages, is often called a ’conceptual space’ (cf. Croft 2001). The goal of semantic mapping therefore is to describe the multifunctionality patterns of morphemes in individual languages and see how these patterns map onto the conceptual space. But while real map-makers make two-dimensional representations of space by taking space, the ’real world’, as their starting point, semantic cartographers have to do it the other way around – space is discovered through the maps (Janda 2009:3).

Haspelmath (2000:7) thinks that it usually suffices to look into a dozen genetically diverse languages to produce a map that will withstand drastic changes as additional languages are brought in. Data from any new language can in principle prompt revisions of the proposed map, if the data contradicts the predictions that the map makes. One of the aims of my thesis would therefore be to look at how well the various uses of the dative in Sanskrit

fit with Haspelmath's own semantic map for the dative category. Do the data from Sanskrit confirm or contradict the predictions made by the Dative map?

3.5 Semantic maps and diachrony

Just as all the functions of a particular morpheme should be related and cover a contiguous area on the semantic map, the extension of a function should be incremental, that is, spread from one function to another function which is adjacent to it. It cannot extend from one function at one end of the map to the other end, without first, or at the same time, acquire the functions in between (Haspelmath 2000:21, Cristofaro 2010:10). A semantic map can thereby predict the path(s) by which the functions of a morpheme extends, and stimulate research into the direction of semantic change. Should historical evidence contradict the predictions made by a semantic map, the map may be in need of revision. Therefore, diachronic studies can be just as valuable as synchronic cross-linguistic comparison for the construction of semantic maps.



Figure 3.4. By turning the dashes into arrows, we can indicate the direction of diachronic change in a semantic map. On this map a morpheme that used to cover only functions B, C, and F (dark shade) has spread, and now covers functions A, B, D, and G (light shade) as well. In line with the Connectivity Hypothesis, the use of a morpheme must spread to an adjacent function of the map, so that if it spreads out from C, it must cover D before it can spread to B. Or alternatively, it may spread to both D and B at once, but in any case it cannot spread to B without spreading to D, since C and B are not connected by lines.

3.6 Haspelmath and the dative

As mentioned, an important part of my thesis is to test the validity of Martin Haspelmath's semantic map for the dative function (1999:126).



Figure 3.5. Semantic map for the dative function[6].

Following are examples from his original formulation of the map (Haspelmath 1999:125-131). He illustrates the map with examples from Russian and French. I have chosen to reproduce the French sentences with their English translations. The functions are expressed with the preposition *à*+noun (once by *pour* instead) in French (and/or the 3rd person singular pronoun *lui*), in English by the prepositions *to* or *for*. There are several instances of ungrammaticality:

1 Direction

*On est allé à Odessa./*On lui est allé.*

'We went to Odessa./We went there.'

2 Recipient

Je donne le livre à Martine./Je lui donne le livre.

'I'll give Martine the book./I'll give her the book.

3 Predicative possessor

*Ce livre est à Pierre-Yves./*Ce livre lui est.*

'This book belongs to Pierre-Yves./This book is his.'

4 Benefactive

**J'ai trouvé un emploi à Mahmoud/Je lui ai trouvé un emploi.*

[6] I have left out the lines, but all the functions in this map are connected hortizontally and vertically, but never diagonally.

'I found a job for Mahmoud./I found a job for him'

5 External possessor

**On a cassé la jambe à Benoît./On lui a cassé la jambe.*

'They broke Benoît's leg./They broke his leg.'

6 Judicantis

**Cette valise lui est trop lourde./Cette valise est trop lourde pour elle.*

'This suitcase is too heavy for her.'

7 Experiencer

Ce livre plaît à Thierry./Ce livre lui plaît.

'Thierry likes this book./He likes this book.'

Under is the semantic map for the three grams in French (red is expressed by *à*, blue by dative (*lui*), purple by both *à* and *lui*, and green by *pour*)[7]:



Figure 3.6

And a map for English (red is expressed by *to*, and green by *for*):



Figure 3.7

[7] If you have a monochromatic version of the thesis, the maps are coloured in the following way. Figure 3.6: red (pred. possessor, direction, experiencer), blue (ext. possessor, benefactive), purple (recipient/addressee), green (judicantis). Figure 3.7: red (direction, recipient/addressee), blue (benefactive, judicantis).

In Sanskrit we are only looking at one gram, the dative, which expresses the following functions of the map (Haspelmath has since added the function 'purpose' to the map (cf. Figure 1.1 in the introduction)):



Figure 3.8

In Sanskrit, the 'stimulus' function can be expressed by a dative, but such a function is not on the map above. The map only depicts functions that are commonly found with dative-like morphemes in various languages of the world – this does not preclude that French *à*, *lui* and English *to*, *for*, and the dative in Sanskrit have other uses, though due to the Connectivity Hypothesis, they should not be terribly far off the edges of the map.

4 Terminology and theoretical background

In this chapter I will introduce the terminology we will be using in analyzing the data from the Ṛgveda. I will do so by analyzing one situation (in English) at various levels, from the more specific to the more general.

4.1 Situations and frames

Let us say that on Tuesday the 6th of November 2007 at 11:22 AM we witnessed an event in which our friend Maria Nazaretian bought a toy dachshund, later to be named Waldi, for her three-year old daughter, Linette, at a flea market in a St. Louis suburb called St. Charles from a man called William Morison, whom we had not met previously, at the price of five dollars, which Maria paid in one-dollar notes.

Through language we organize the flow of events in our experience, and the dachshund purchase was one such event. A language has ready-made structures for us to represent this event in various ways as we need and like. We do not need to include every little detail of the situation when we want to talk about it, and some aspects of it will be more important to us than others.

The most central part of the above situation is the exchange that happens: Maria gives Mr. Morison five dollars, and in return Mr. Morison gives Maria the toy dog. We can view this exchange in (at least) two ways: as a purchase or a as a sale. In construing it as a purchase, using the verb 'buy', certain aspects of the exchange are forced to the fore. In a situation of 'buying' we have a 'buyer' (in this case Maria) and something which is bought, a 'commodity' (in this case the toy dachshund). These two participants in the situation are required in English to make a sentence with the verb 'buy' grammatical – we cannot say **Maria bought* or **bought a toy dog*, we must say *Maria bought a toy dog*, that is, 'buyer' and 'commodity' are obligatory parts of a purchase *frame*. A frame is a 'schematization of particular situation types and their components such as the events or states expressed by simple verbs or adjectives' (Fillmore 2006:613).

A word evokes certain frames in the minds of us as speakers of English and as members of a particular culture. As a Northern European living in the 21st century, I would

know that a the ‘commodity’ participant in a purchase frame is typically not human. If you said that *Maria bought her neighbour’s husband for a dime*, I would think that that is too cheap and/or objectionable, maybe weird, a joke or understand that the word ‘buy’ is used in a different sense and thereby evoking a different frame, where ‘commodity’ [+human] is more acceptable.

That our knowledge of frames helps us determine the background scene of a sentence is evident when we look at the following two examples (Fillmore 2006:613; Hamm 2007:1):

(1) I spent three hours on land this afternoon.
(2) I spent three hours on the ground this afternoon.

We know that sentence (1) probably describes someone’s interruption in a sea voyage, even though this is not expressed in the sentence at all. We know this because ‘land’ contrasts with ‘sea’ – ‘sea’ is part of the background frame of the word ‘land’. And sentence (2) probably describes someone’s interruption of a period of air travel, since we know that ‘air’ is part of the frame of ‘ground’. In the same way, ‘buyer’ and ‘thing bought’ are evoked whenever we have the verb ‘buy’. Therefore I will later in this chapter spend some time talking about different situation types, since various types will evoke specific participants. In other words, the use of a specific type of dative will (often) be predictable since they are part of a verb’s frame.

Going back to our flea market scene, we can describe it using a different word, ‘sell’, which would project a sale frame. Having witnessed the scene, we know that Maria is still the buyer, but she now has the possibility of being backgrounded when using the word ‘sell’. What is in the fore is the ‘seller’, Mr Morison, and the thing sold, Waldi the dachshund, who we know is at the same time the thing bought, since we know ‘selling’ involves ‘buying’ – that is part of the background frame of ‘sell’. But ‘seller’ and ‘commodity sold’ are the only participants in the sale frame which have to be obligatorily expressed in English – we cannot say **Mr Morison sold* or **sold a toy dog*. Different words give us the possibility (or sometimes forces us) to foreground or background the aspects of the situation we want to talk about.

4.2 Semantic roles and case

Every word projects its unique frame, if we accept that there rarely are true synonyms. For example, the words ‘throw’, ‘hurl’ and ‘toss’ may all have the basic sense ‘make something fly through the air’, but they differ in terms of the force applied and the care or carelessness with which the object is made to fly. But a language would be quite difficult to handle, or rather, a world would be quite difficult to handle if every imaginable situation in which we could find ourselves in involved entities interacting with one another in a completely random and unpredictable fashion. Rather, situations repeat themselves over and over again, and we are able to see both similiarities between them and make generalizations based upon them, however slightly different they might be. Not only do we, when we are out buying groceries, for example, find that today money is no longer accepted as payment, and tomorrow you will putting on price tags on customers, and tomatoes will buy *you*, but we also see the similarities between shopping in a grocery store, buying old stuff at a flea market, and ordering plane tickets on the internet.

Let us decide to represent the toy dog purchase scene above as the sentence *Maria bought a toy dog for Linette at the flea market*. We can analyze the sentence as consisting of five parts – one verb (underlined) describing the event and projecting the *purchase scene*, and four participants:

Maria	bought	a toy dog	for Linette	at the flea market.

The four participants play four different roles. In this particular sentence two of the participants are marked for their role – the preposition ‘for’ in *for Linette* signals that Linette is the (intended) recipient of the thing bought, and the preposition ‘at’ in *at the flea market* signals that the flea market is the location where the buying took place. The other two participants are not marked with any word to show what kind of role they play in the sentence, but their position with respect to the verb tells us what role they have – the ‘buyer’ (normally) *precedes* the verb in English, and the ‘thing bought’ *follows* the verb.

Let us add the roles to our analysis:

1	Maria	bought	a toy dog	for Linette	at the flea market.
2+3	buyer	buys	thing bought	recipient (of thing bought)	location (of buying)

The words and word groups in row 1 I will call the 'situational participants', that is those participants which are specific to a given situation. The words and word groups in row 2 I will call 'frame participants', and row 3 (which is identical to row 2 in this case) I will call 'frame type roles'. I differentiate here between 'frames' and 'frame types'. 'Frames' are unique to every single word, and 'frame types' are groupings together of the frames of separate words projecting similar frames. Row 2 is unique to the verb 'buy', but I also want to use the same labels to mark the participants of the near-synonymous frames of words such as 'purchase' and 'acquire'.

The terms I have used to describe these three different levels of analysis (level 1: 'situational participants', level 2: 'frame participants', and level 3: 'frame type roles') are not standard in grammatical description, nor are these levels particularly important in a phenomenon such as case assignment (though we will make use of them in our analysis of the Ṛgvedic data). For example, no language assigns Maria the nominative case on the basis of her being Maria alone, or say, the King of France should always receive the ablative since he is the King of France and not the Queen of Sheba. Keep in mind that all we have done at level 1 is to abstract a piece of Universe, for example lumping together all (or some) aspects of 'Mariahood' present at the flea market under the word 'Maria' and differentiated her from, among other things, the ground below her. We have not said anything about the *relationships* between our purposefully created chunks of Universe.

Nor are levels 2 and 3 important in case assignment. I know of no language which has an 'emptorative' marker (that is, a 'buyer' case or adposition), for example, nor does a participant playing the role of 'buyer' receive the pre-verb position on the basis of being a 'buyer' alone. It does take the pre-verb position *in relation to* the verb 'buy', but if we construe the flea market scene as a *sale* scene, the 'buyer' would be marked with the preposition 'to', as in *Mr. Morison sold the dachshund to Maria*.

Level 4, on the other hand, is a crucially important one. This is the level of 'thematic roles'. The similarities between Pāṇini's concept of *kārakas* and thematic roles have been noted, for instance in Wechsler (2006:647), who says that Charles Fillmore (who also helped in developing the concept of 'frames') in 1968 'revived' the Pāṇinian concept of *kārakas* in his influential theory of Case Grammar. Fillmore sought a way to explain why a sentence such as 'Personally, I don't like roses.' is felicitous, but a sentence like '*Personally, I hit you.' is not (Fillmore 1972 in Radford 2004:252). The sentences are parallel in that they both contain a monotransitive verb, a subject and an object, but the use of 'personally' in the latter example sounds odd, so a reference to syntactic relations only is not sufficient. It is the fact

that the 'I' in the first sentence is an EXPERIENCER (that is, an entity experiencing a psychological state), and not (as in the second example) an AGENT (that is, an entity initiating an event), that makes the use of 'personally' possible. Fillmore called these semantic relations 'cases' (hence the name of his theory), but today one usually calls them 'thematic roles'.

Thematic roles constitute a level of analysis intermediate between a situational or frame participant and the linguistic expression of this participant. There is no agreement as to how many thematic roles to reckon with. Nor is there always agreement as to how to use the different role labels. But the following inventory of roles is common, give or take a few (cf. Radford 2004, Kroeger 2005, Haegeman 2006):

agent	entity causing or initiating an event
patient	entity acted upon or affected by an event
theme	entity undergoing a change of location or possession
experiencer	entity perceiving a stimulus or experiencing a psychological state
recipient	entity receiving something
beneficiary	entity benefitting from an action
instrument	entity used to perform an action
stimulus	entity which is the object of perception, cognition or emotion
location	place in which something is situated or in which an event takes place
source	place from which something moves
goal	place to which something moves

Adding the fourth level of analysis to our example sentence we get:

1	Maria	bought	a toy dog	for Linette	at the flea market.
2+3	buyer	buys	thing bought	recipient (of thing bought)	location (of buying)
4	agent	-	theme	recipient/beneficiary	location

By reducing the number of frame roles (which are innumerous) to about eleven thematic roles, we have greatly narrowed the path for our next destination: the assignment of case. But

considering the fact the Sanskrit has seven cases (excluding the vocative), we are not there yet. And knowing a participant's thematic role does not guarantee us certainty about its case expression. For example, let us add the price (a frame role) *for five dollars* to the sentence. This would be analyzed as another THEME in terms of thematic role (the money changes hands just like the dachshund, but moves in the opposite direction). But it would not be expressed (in English) as another noun phrase tacked on right after the verb like the other THEME *a toy dog*, but rather as a prepositional phrase *for five dollars*. In order to choose the correct case we have to make reference to the particular verb in question. The verb decides whether something has to be obligatorily expressed or can optionally expressed.

4.3 Arguments and valency

An obligatorily expressed participant I will refer to as an argument and an optionally expressed participant an adjunct. In English arguments are usually expressed through a noun phrase in the subject and direct object positions, and sometimes the indirect object position, while adjuncts are usually prepositional phrases. In Sanskrit, which has a fairly elaborate case system, both arguments and adjuncts are usually expressed with noun phrases, so the distinction becomes somewhat blurrier, but still we can make a hierarchy among the cases, where the nominative, accusative and dative are the cases most commonly used to express arguments, while the other cases are more rarely used for that purpose. Our case, the dative, is interesting in that regard, since many instances of the dative are arguments, while many are adjuncts. Whether it is one or the other crucially depends upon the process type in question.

Valency refers to the number of argument places a predicate (usually a verb) has. A *monovalent* verb has one argument, a *divalent* verb two, and a *trivalent* verb has three arguments. Very often, the term transitivity is used in stead of valency. Transitivity refers to the number of *objects* a verb has, rather than the number of arguments (that is, one does not count the subject argument. An *intransitive* verb has no object, a *transitive* verb has one object, and a *ditransitive* verb has two objects.

As we shall see later, a dative marked NP in Sanskrit is usually one of the arguments of a trivalent verb, and only occasionally the argument of a divalent verb. The number of arguments a verb has is largely determined by the verb's process type, which is the subject of the next section.

4.4 Types of processes

In this thesis I will use a version of Van Valin and LaPolla's (1997) classification of process types. I will not list all the types since they are not all relevant to us. They distinguish four main types based upon the inherent temporal properties of a process (*aktionsart*), that is, whether they are static or dynamic, instantaneous or temporally extended, and have an inherent endpoint or not (*telicity*):

main types	**definition and example verbs**
state	static and without an inherent endpoint,
	e.g. be sick, be tall, be dead, love, know, believe, have
activity	dynamic and without an inherent endpoint,
	e.g. march, walk, roll, swim, think, rain, read, eat
achievement	instantaneous change of state,
	e.g. pop, explode, collapse, shatter
accomplishment	change of state taking place over a longer period of time,
	e.g. melt, freeze, dry, recover from illness, learn

Of these, I think achievements are the least relevant to us. It is not that they cannot occur with a dative (in all probability they can), but I just have not seen any examples of that.

Van Valin and LaPolla (1997:115) go on to list 22 subtypes of processes – 11 state process types and 11 activity process types. After studying the dative in the Ṛgveda, I have come to the conclusion that it serves little practical purpose to differentiate between different activity process types. Therefore, in this thesis we shall only use the following pattern:

action (x=effector, (y))

The underlined word is the predicate (here just any type of 'action'). Within the parentheses are the arguments. 'x' stands for the first argument, which is the effector (the wilfull instigator of an action event), and 'y' stands for the second argument of an activity predicate, which could refer to the action itself, a tool being used in performing an action, something which comes about through the action, etc. It all depends on which type of action we are talking about, but we shall not concern ourselves with that here. The 'y' argument is put in parenthesis since not all activity predicates are ditransitive.

All activity verbs are likely to be able to occur with a dative participant, unlike states. But a dative marked NP rarely fills in the 'x' or 'y' argument position. In other words, dative NPs in sentences with an activity predicate are adjuncts rather than arguments. They are optional rather than obligatory. With state verbs the relationship between the predicate and the dative marked NP seems to be much closer in that the dative is often required by the verb. For instance, the emotion verb *ḥṛ* 'be angry with', requires the y=target (i.e. the person with whom you are angry) to be a dative.

Therefore the state/activity distinction seems to be a particularly useful and interesting one, which we will have to look more into.

As for achievement and accomplishment verbs, they are analyzed as states or activities with an added *change* dimension, therefore I will not list them here, as most would just be repeating the state and activity lists above. For instance, the verb *melt*, as in 'The snowman melted', is analyzed as 'become-melted' (i.e. the snowman went from a state of not being melted to a state of being melted).

Here is the list of Van Valin and LaPolla's state process types (A1-A2 have one argument, while B1-B9 have two arguments)[8]:

A1 state or condition (x=patient)

How did this dish$_x$ get BROKEN?

A2 existence (x=entity)

Does life$_x$ EXIST on other planets?

B1 pure location (x=location, y=theme)

The file$_y$ IS-ON the table$_x$.

B2 perception (x=perceiver, y=stimulus)

She$_x$ HEARD footsteps$_y$ behind her.

B3 cognition (x=cognizer, y=content)

Do you$_x$ KNOW his address$_y$?

B4 desire (x=wanter, y=desire)

Do you$_x$ WANT some more tea$_y$?

B5 propositional attitude (x=judger, y=judgment)

He$_x$ considered himself an expert on the subject$_y$.

B6 possession (x=possessor, y=possessed)

[8] The examples are taken from the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (7th ed.).

He$_x$ HAD a new car$_y$.

B7 internal experience (x=experiencer, y=sensation)

He$_x$ FELT faint$_y$.

B8 emotion (x=emoter, y=target)

She$_x$ LOVED her children$_y$.

B9 attributional/identificational (x=attributant, y=attribute)

Life$_x$ IS unfair$_y$.

Verbs like 'put' and 'give' are analyzed as *causative location* and *causative possession* respectively (Van Valin and LaPolla 1997:126-7):

put [**do**' (x, ∅)] CAUSE [BECOME **be-LOC**' (y,z)]

(x=effector, y=location, z=theme)

Did you$_x$ PUT sugar$_z$ in my coffee$_y$?

give [**do**' (x, ∅)] CAUSE [BECOME **have**' (y,z)]

(x=effector, y=possessor, z=possessed)

She$_x$ GAVE her ticket$_z$ to the woman$_y$.

I will use the classification and labels used by Van Valin and LaPolla in this thesis, but not necessarily their notational conventions.

5 The dative in Sanskrit

5.1 Morphology of the Sanskrit dative.

Sanskrit nominals have the following shape:

root+(thematic vowel)+inflection

Sanskrit is a cumulative language *par excellence*, and so the inflectional morpheme on nominals expresses the grammatical features case, number, and gender, all at once. We cannot therefore isolate a distinct 'dative' morpheme, it will depend upon number, and possibly gender (see below)[9]. The following table gives a representative overview of dative forms in Sanskrit:

stem type	sg	du	pl
consonant (e.g. rā́jan)	**rājñe** (rājan+e)	**rājabhyām** (rā́jan+bhyām)	**rājabhyas** (rā́jan+bhyas)
radical -ā (e.g. jā́)	**jé** (jā́+e)	**jābhyām** (jā́+bhyām)	**jābhyas** (jā́+bhyas)
derivative –a (e.g. priyá)	**priyāya** prī(+a?)+ai(+a)	**priyābhyām** (prī+á(+a)+bhyām)	**priyébhyas** (prī+á(+i)+bhyas)
derivative – ā (e.g. priyā́)	**priyāyai** (prī+ā́+ai)	**priyābhyām** (prī+ā+bhyām)	**priyābhyas** (prī+ā+bhyas)
derivative –ii (e.g. devī́)	**devyái** (dev+ī́+ai)	**devī́bhyām** (dev+ ī́-bhyām)	**devī́bhyas** (dev+ ī́+bhyas)
derivative –i (e.g. śúci)	**śúcaye** (śúc+e+e)	**śúcibhyām** (śúc+i-bhyām)	**śúcibhyas** (śúc+i+bhyas)
derivative –ū (e.g. tanū́)	**tanúe** (or **tanvé**) (tan+ū́+e)	**tanū́bhyām** (tan+ū́+bhyām)	**tanū́bhyas** (tan+ū́+byas)

[9] Though it seems likely that the 's' which occurs in so many of the plural forms could be analyzed as the remnants of a once segregatable plural marker: *devā́s* (NOM), *deváís* (INS), *devébhyas* (DAT/ABL), *devé́su* (LOC). The long *ā* in ACC *devān* is probably due to compensatory lengthening due to an original *s* (cf. PIE *deiwons*).

derivative –u	**mádhave**, or **mádhve**	**mádhubhyām**	**mádhubhyas**
(e.g. madhu)	(mádh+o+e) (mádh+u+e)	(madh+u+bhyām)	(mádh+u+bhyas)
dem. pronoun:	**tá-smai** (mn)	(tā-bhyām) (mf)	**té-bhyas** (mn)
(e.g. tá-)	**tá-syai** (f)	(syncr: abl)	**tā́-bhyas** (f)
dem. pronoun:	**a-smái** (mn)	**ā-bhyām** (m)	**e-bhyás** (m)
(e.g. ayám)	**a-syái** (f)	(syncr: abl)	**aa-bhyás** (f)

In the dual and plural the dative morpheme is constant throughout, *-bhyām* and *–bhyas* respectively. Their rather marked character should make them ideal for being looked up in an electronic text (compare the much shorter singular endings), but sadly they suffer from syncretism. Plural *–bhyas* is identical to the ablative plural, while dual *–bhyām* is identical to both the ablative and the instrumental dual. This would add extra work in having to determine whether something actually is a dative. With the singular forms, there is no syncretism, but being vocalic, they suffer from assimilation, especially when the stem also ends in a vowel. There appears to be a myriad of forms, *e/āya/āyai/yai/aye/ue/ave/ve*, but when we undo the assimilations, and separate the thematic vowel from the inflectional ending, the dative singular marker is basically *e* or *ai* (where *ai* simply is a lengthened version of *e*). Note that the picture is complicated a bit with stems with derivate –a, which in later stages of Sanskrit by far is the most common stem type. Here, either the thematic vowel is added *after* the case ending (*prīy+ai+a* > *prīyāya*), breaking the usual pattern, or it is indeed placed after the root, but then something else is added after the case ending (*prīy+a+e/ai+a* > *prīyāya*). Both combinations yield the same form, *prīyāya*, and thanks to this oddity the ending *–āya* is distinct enough for it to be easily looked up in an electronic text, and this is in fact the form we will most commonly encounter in our examples.

5.2 Semantic vs. grammatical case

A distinction is often made between semantic cases and grammatical (or syntactic) cases. Semantic cases mark *semantic* relations, while grammatical cases mark *grammatical* relations. For example:

(5.1)

reṇukā	*gaṅgāyāṃ*	*pāṇibhyāṃ*	*jalam*	*āharat*
Reṇukā-NOM.SG	Gaṅgā-LOC.SG	hand-INS.DU	water-ACC.SG	fetch-IPF.ACT.3SG

'Reṇukā fetched water in the Gaṅgā with her hands'

The location of this event is the Gaṅgā (marked with a locative ending), and the instrument used in fetching the water is her hands (marked with an instrumental ending). These are *semantic* relations. Now, Reṇukā, which is marked with a nominative ending, is the agent. But the nominative is not a marker of her agency, since patients and other semantic roles are also frequently marked with nominative. It is instead subjecthood which is marked by the nominative, and 'subject' is a *grammatical* relation. Likewise, 'the water' is the patient, but the accusative does not mark it for being a patient, but rather for being an object, another *grammatical* relation.

Apart from nominative and accusative, genitive and 'our' case, the dative, is often regarded as grammatical cases (Blake 2001:31).

But the distinction is often not very clear-cut. An accusative can often mark goal (a semantic relation), as in: *vidarbham agamaṃs tadā* 'Then they went to the country of Vidarbha' (Speijer 1886:29), and the dative also marks both grammatical relations (e.g. indirect object) and semantic relations (e.g. benefactive). With this in mind, how can we say that the dative in the following sentence marks *direct object* (a grammatical relation), and not *recipient* (a semantic relation)?

(5.2)

indro	*viprāya*	*gāṃ*	*dadāti*
Indra-NOM.SG	priest-DAT.SG	cow-ACC.SG	give-PRS.ACT.3SG

'Indra gives the priest a cow'

and likewise, in the next sentence, why does the dative mark *benefactive* (i.e. why isn't a benefactive argument also a *direct object*)?

(5.3)

indro	*viprāya*	*pattraṃ*	*likhati*
Indra-NOM.SG	priest-DAT.SG	letter-ACC.SG	write-PRS.ACT.3SG

'Indra writes a letter for the priest'

This distinction has to be understood in light of *government*, that is, whether a noun phrase is governed by the verb or not. We have already touched upon this topic, when talking about arguments and adjuncts (in section 4.3). Those NPs which are governed by a verb are referred to as *complements*, and those which are not governed by a verb are called *adjuncts*. In English, complements are usually unmarked NPs, while adjuncts are realized as prepositional phrases. We saw that in the translation of the two examples above: *Indra gives the priest a cow* (three complement NPs) (though *to the priest* (complement PP) is also possible for the indirect object), and *Indra writes a letter for the priest* (adjunct PP). But looking at form (NP vs. PP) won't get us far is Sanskrit, which is a fairly elaborate case language where most participants are NPs. We have to look at what it means for an argument to be governed by a verb. It means that it is *required* in order to make the utterance *grammatical*. For example, if we were to ask the question: 'What did Indra do?', the reply *'He gave a cow' would be akward unless it was a reply to a question for clarification, as in 'What was it that Indra gave'? The recipient *has to* be expressed (at least in English). But in the other example (5.3), if we were to ask: 'What did Indra do?', we could reply, 'He wrote a letter', leaving out the benefactive, since it is not required for the sentence to be grammatical.

Now, in order to test for grammaticality and determine whether something is a complement or an adjunct, we should ideally check with native speakers of Ṛgvedic Sanskrit. But since those are scarce these days, and since the composers (or editors) of the Ṛgveda did not afford us the luxury of marking ungrammatical sentences (if there are any) with an asterisk, we have to take the absence of, let's say, verbs of giving without recipients as an indication that the recipient is required and therefore a complement. (Then we can try to support this with reference to cross-linguistic tendencies.)

5.3 Earlier works on the dative in Sanskrit

I have found Berthold Delbrück's (1888) *Altindische Syntax* to be especially helpful. He lists many different verbs taking the dative, classifying them according to what type of verb they are (pp. 140-150). His scope is much broader than mine, as he describes the dative in all of the Vedic literature, using examples especially from the Ś*atapathabrāhmaṇa* and the *Taittirīyasaṃhita,* but occasionally from the Ṛgveda as well. I have used his list as a starting point for my survey of the dative in the Ṛgveda. Some of the verbs do not occur with the dative in the Ṛgveda, and some of the verbs are not to be found there at all. Sometimes

Delbrück specifically states this, but other times it was up to me to find out whether they were there or not. Sometimes he cites passages, occasionally with translations, sometimes he only gives the number of the verse, and sometimes he just notes that this verb takes the dative.

Delbrück makes no attempt to find a common sense for all of the types of datives and says that 'Ueber den Grundbegriff des Dativs wird gestritten' (1888:140). He also says that the order in which the verbs are presented is 'willkürlich' (ibid.).

I have also used Jean Haudry's book about the use of case in Vedic (1977). It was especially helpful in finding examples of case variation. His translations have also been useful. But as I am not fully proficient in French, I have had to rely a little less on him than I have wanted to, simply for the sake of time.

I have also used E. Washburn Hopkins' *Aspects of the Vedic Dative* (1907), where he deals with, yes, certain aspects of the Vedic dative. Hermann Grassmann's *Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda* (1955) has notes on case usage for every verb in the Ṛgveda, and has also been very useful. Even Monier Monier-William's *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (2008 [1899]) has some notes on case usage, and he occassionally refers to passages in the Ṛgveda

5.4 Pāṇini and the dative

Following are the sūtras in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* which define the *kāraka* (thematic role) *sampradāna* (lit. 'giving over', usually translated as 'recipient'), which is responsible for the assignment of the dative case. What is interesting to note is that he covers all (but one) of the semantic roles that we have described in relation to the dative: RECIPIENT (including ADDRESSEE), EXPERIENCER, BENEFICIARY, and STIMULUS (the only role that is not found is GOAL). But the list he gives of verbs which take the *sampradāna* is rather short, and must be incomplete. Where, for instance, is the passage dealing with common verbs of speaking, such as *vad*, *vac*, *ah*, and *brū*? Are they regarded as a form of 'giving' and therefore included in the first sūtra, or is this an indication of the diminishing role of the dative? Or, is this an indication of me still struggling with Pāṇini? There might be other verses dealing with the 'recipient' *kāraka* among the 4000 sūtras which I haven't come across (and as we know, Pāṇini is not ordered in any ordinary way, although these sūtras come rather nicely on a string, 1.4.32-1.4.41 (with the exception of the irrelevant 1.4.38)).

Below I list all the sūtras with translations and examples (based on Katre 1987:85-7), the type of process and the kind of dative they take.

A 1.4.32

kármaṇā yám abhipraíti sá sampradānam

object.INS he.ACC approach.3SG he.NOM giving.NOM

'The one whom someone intends [as a goal] through the object [of an act of giving] is [called] *sampradāna* ('recipient').

devadattāya gām dádāti 'he gives a cow to Devadatta'

causative possession, with RECIPIENT dative

A 1.4.33

rúci=arthānām prīyámāṇaḥ

'The one who is pleased in relation to verbal stems meaning 'to please' is called *sampradā́na* ('recipient').

devadattā́ya módako rócate 'Devadatta likes sweetmeats' or 'sweetmeats please Devadatta'

internal experience, with EXPERIENCER dative

A 1.4.34

ślā́gha-hnuṅ-sthā-śapāM jñīpsyámānaḥ

'The one who is to be informed in relation to the verbal stems *ślāgh* 'praise', *hnu* 'hide', *sthā* 'express one's desire', and *śap* 'swear', is called *sampradā́na* ('recipient').

1. *devadattā́ya ślāghate* 'he praises Devadatta'

   activity, with ADDRESSEE/BENEFACTIVE dative
2. *gopíi kṛṣṇā́ya hnuté* 'the gopíi hides Kṛṣṇa (from his wives)'

   activity, with THEME dative (?) (I have not found this type of dative in the Ṛgveda)
3. *tíṣṭhate kanyā́ chattrā́ya* 'the maiden reveals her desires to the pupil'

   causative cognition, with COGNIZER/EXPERIENCER dative
4. *devadattā́ya śápati* 'he swears at Devadatta'

   activity: saying, with ADDRESSEE dative

A 1.4.35

dhārér uttamarṇáḥ

'A creditor in relation to the causal verbal stem *dhār* 'owe', is called *sampradā́na* ('recipient').

devadattā́ya śatám dhāráyati 'he owes Devadatta a hundred pieces'

(I have not found this type of dative in the Ṛgveda)

A 1.4.36

spṛhér īpsitáḥ

'That which is desired in relation to the verbal stem *spṛh* 'long for', is called *sampradā́na* ('recipient').

phálebhyaḥ spṛháyati 'he longs for fruit'

state: desire, with DESIRE/STIMULUS dative

A 1.4.37

krudhÁ-druhÁ-īrṣyÁ=asūyā́nām

'The one towards whom anger is felt in relation to the verbal stems *krudh* 'be angry', *druh* 'harm', *īrṣy* 'envy', and *asūy* 'be displeased', is called *sampradā́na* ('recipient').

1. *devadattā́ya krudhyáti* 'he is angry with Devadatta'
   state: emotion, with TARGET/STIMULUS dative
2. *devadattā́ya druhyáti* 'he harms Devadatta'
   activity, with MALEFACTIVE dative
3. *devadattā́ya íirṣyati* 'he envies Devadatta'
   state: emotion, with TARGET/STIMULUS dative
4. *yajñadattā́ya asūyati* 'he is displeased with Devadatta'
   state: emotion, with TARGET/STIMULUS dative

A 1.4.39

rādh-īkṣyor yásya vipraśnáḥ

'The one about whom there is a questioning in relation to the verbal stems *rā́dh* 'prophesy' and *īkṣ* 'foretell, observe (the stars)', is called *sampradā́na* ('recipient').

1. *devadattā́ya rādhyáti* 'he prophesies to Devadatta' or 'he casts Devadatta's horoscope'
   activity: verbal, with ADDRESSEE dative, or:

activity, with BENEFACTIVE dative

2. *yajñadattā́ya īkṣate* 'he looks into Yajñadatta's horoscope'
   activity, with BENEFACTIVE dative

A 1.4.40

práti=ā́ṅbhyāṃ śruvaḥ púurvasya kartā́

'The agent of the previous act (of requesting) in relation to the verbal stem *śru* 'listen' co-occurring with the preverbs *práti-* or *ā́-* (meaning 'agree to, promise'), is called *sampradā́na* ('recipient').

devadattā́ya gā́m práti-śṛṇoti 'he promises a cow to Devadatta
activity-verbal (?), with ADDRESSEE/RECIPIENT dative

A 1.4.41

anu-prati-gṛṇaś ca

'The agent of the previous act (of uttering a praise) in relation to the verbal stem *gṝ* 'praise' co-occurring with the preverbs *ánu-* and *práti-* (meaning 'to respond to a praise'), is called *sampradā́na* ('recipient').

hótre ánu-gṛṇāti 'he responds to the hótṛ with praise'
activity-verbal, with ADDRESSEE dative

6 The dative in the Ṛgveda

In this chapter I will provide examples of the use of the dative in the Ṛgveda, while progressively filling in the premade semantic map, and attempting to justify the categorizations of the datives. Before I begin I will briefly say something about translation, glossing and transliteration.

The translations I give will be mine, based on the glosses. As support I have used Griffith's (1896) translation into English and Geldner's (1923) translation into German. And to the extent that he deals with the passages in question, I have also used Haudry's (1977) treatise, which is in French. Where the translators disagree, I have had to make a choice, and I have chosen to be as literal as possible, even though this might not be the best choice poetically, nor the most 'correct' one with respect to the world of the Ṛgveda. Where I have deemed the differences between the translations to be significant or relevant, I have tried to address that. The dictionaries I have used are Monier-William's *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (2008 [1899]) as well as Grassmann's (1955 [1873]) *Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda*.

As for the Sanskrit text itself, I have used the online version of van Nooten and Holland's (1994) metrically restored version of the Ṛgveda, which has the advantage of being accented as well as pastable. I have tried to isolate the passages as much as possible, leaving out information I have deemed not to be important. I think this makes the passages more readable and easier to analyze. This means that the passages may not appear as they do in the original text. Whenever I have left something out, I have marked this with '[...]'. And I have not shuffled the words – they appear in their original order.

In transliterating the text, I have diverged slightly from the IAST[10] (which is used in the metrically restored text). I have used a transliteration scheme in which all words are separated, but where the words are assimilated nonetheless. This is indicated by special markers. A circumflex (^) marks that a vowel is long, but was short before the assimilation took place. For example, *ca+anye*, which normally becomes *cānye* in IAST, is rendered as *c' ânye*. The sign (') marks that a short vowel is elided, while (") marks that a long vowel is elided. Again I think this makes for readability and analyzability. This system is for instance used in the books of the Clay Sanskrit Library.

[10] The International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration

6.1 Recipient datives

A RECIPIENT expresses a participant who receives something (a THEME). The THEME starts out being in the possession or domain of someone else (the 'giver'), but through an act of giving the theme ends up being in the possession or domain of the RECIPIENT. A process of giving can therefore be analyzed as a causative possession process (cf. Van Valin and LaPolla 126-7).

6.1.1 Datives with verbs of 'giving'

'Giving' is probably the most central process in which a dative-marked argument occurs. After all it gives its name to the *dative* case in the Western tradition, as well as to the Pāṇinian counterpart of *sampradānam* (cf. 5.4 above), as evidenced by the 'da' part in both these concepts. No surprise then that Sanskrit has a verb which expresses 'giving' which is simply *dā*:

(6.1) RV 1.133.7f

sunvānāya	*indro*	*dadāti*	*ābhúvaṃ*
pressing.out-DAT.SG	Indra-NOM.SG	give-PRS.ACT.3SG	helper-ACC.SG

'Indra gives helpful (wealth) to the one who presses out (Soma)'

Here, an AGENT (a 'donor') gives a THEME (a 'gift') to a RECIPIENT, who can also become the POSSESSOR of the THEME.

Note here that many of the situations we will be looking at come from the context of a sacrifice, in which those who are addressed are often gods, and in which no physical transfer may be taking place, or at least may not immediately be taking place, even though the situations often are framed that way. Still, I would take the view that these situational constructions are based on actual (that is, concrete and immediate) situations taking place in the authors (or their ancestors) everyday life. I do not think that the verbs we will be looking at had their use only in the context of a sacrifice, even though used in a polished and non-colloquial language, and even used in archaic ways. Keep this in mind as we go on.

Another verb meaning 'to give' is *yam* (originally 'holding up, extending [one's arm (as one often does in a physical act of giving)] (cf. Monier-Williams)):

(6.2) RV 2.35.15a

ayāṃsam	*agne*	*sukṣitím*	*jánāya*
extend-AOR.ACT.1SG	Agni-VOC.SG	good.dwelling-ACC.SG	people-DAT.SG

'Agni, I gave good dwelling to the people'

The construction is very similar to that of *dā*, although the object often does not refer to a physical gift, but rather to something more abstract, such as 'shelter' (cf. RV 6.16.33).

The verb *dhā* is also used in the sense of 'giving' (the more common sense of this verb is 'to put, place', which could also be an aspect of the physical act of giving):

(6.3) RV 1.93.6d

áth'	*ā*	*dhattaṃ*	*yájamānāya*	*śáṃ*	*yóḥ*
then	PREV	place-IPV.ACT.2DU	sacrificer-DAT.SG	happiness-IND	welfare-IND

'grant happiness and welfare to the sacrificer'

These dative arguments clearly have a 'recipient' function, and we can place them in our semantic map under the recipient/addressee category, and label them 'recipient of an act of giving' or $\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{give}}$ for short. Since $\text{RECIPIENTS}_{\text{give}}$ often through the nature of the situation become the possessors of the THEME, we can place them closer to the 'possessor' category than let's say, $\text{RECIPIENTS}_{\text{bring}}$, in which case the THEME is brought into a local proximity with the RECIPIENTS, but the RECIPIENTS do not necessarily become the possessors of the THEME. We can also place $\text{RECIPIENTS}_{\text{bring}}$ closer to the 'possessor' category than ADDRESSEES, who do not in any obvious way become the possessors of the words spoken or sung to them. ADDRESSEES are also 'perceivers' and therefore more 'experiencer'-like.

	predicative possessor	external possessor
direction	$\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{give}}$	benefactive
purpose	experiencer	

Semantic map 6.1

The reason why recipients/addressees are placed together on the map is that none of the languages Haspelmath (1999) looked at mark such a distinction grammatically. The finer-grained distinctions we will make here will only serve to get a fuller overview of the use of the dative in Vedic Sanskrit, and such distinctions are probably treyf in the tradition of Semantic Map making (cf. section 3.3). They are wholly my suggestions, and could be taken as suggestions for a possible more detailed representation of this chunk of Semantic Space, which can only be confirmed by looking into more languages.

The verb *ava-duh* means 'to give milk' (cf. *dugdha* 'milk'), and one would therefore either expect the object of the verb to be a milk-like substance or expect that the object not be expressed since milk is implied by the verb itself. But this verb is also used in a general sense of 'to give'. For example:

(6.4) RV 6.48.13a-b

bharádvājāya	*áva*	*dhukṣata*	*dvitā*	*dhenúṃ*	*[...]*
Bharádvāja-DAT.SG	PREV	milk-AOR.SUBJ.3SG	indeed-IND	milk.cow-ACC.SG	

'She gave the milk cow to Bharádvāja'

Here, the object (or 'gift') is not milk, but a milch-cow. The dative can be analyzed as either a RECIPIENT or a BENEFACTIVE, or both. Griffith says 'for Bharadvāja', likewise, Geldner says 'für Bharadvāja'.

The verb *diś* normally means 'to point out', but also has the sense of 'giving'. Using Monier-Williams, a possible semantic development could be: point out > show > bring forward > give. For example:

(6.5) RV 2.41.17d

prajāṃ	*devi*	*didiḍḍhi*	*naḥ*
offspring-ACC.SG	goddess-VOC.SG	point.out-IPV.ACT.2SG	1PL.DAT

'Goddess, grant us offspring'

naḥ is of course ambiguous. Monier-Williams refers specifically to RV 2.41.17 and gives the meaning 'assign, grant, bestow upon' and says that it should be interpreted as a dative. In later texts, *diś* in the sense 'to give' could also take the genitive or the locative, according to Monier-Williams. It is not uncommon for words meaning 'show' to take a dative object. For instance in Spanish the verb *mostrar* takes the dative pronoun *le* (Delbecque and Lamiroy

1996:93). And when the meaning is ‘give’, as it is in the Ṛgvedic passage above, the dative is a natural candidate for expressing the RECIPIENT.

Another verb used in the sense of ’giving’ is *pṛc*, which normally means ’to mix’:

(6.6) RV 6.68.8b

pṛ́ñktáṃ	*rayíṃ*	*sauśravasāya*	*devā*
mix-IPV.ACT.2DU	wealth-ACC.SG	good.reputation-DAT.SG	god-VOC.PL

‘Gods, give wealth to the one who has good reputation (or: for the sake of good reputation)’

Haudry (1977:239) translates *pṛc* in this case as ’donner en abondance’, and Monier-Williams gives one possible translation as ’give lavishly’, which he states governs the dative. Geldner says ’mehreren’. All these translations suggest that we are not just talking about ’giving’, but ’giving in great amounts’. This is possible if we see the verb *pṛc* as connected with the root *pṛ*, which means to ’fill’. Griffith, however, translates the example above as: ’mingle ye wealth with our heroic glory’, where the dative expresses the thing with which something is mingled.

The verb *mā* usually means to ’measure out’, but is also used in the sense of ’apportioning’:

(6.7) RV 1.120.9b

rāyé	*ca*	*no*	*mimītáṃ*	*vājavatyai*
wealth-DAT.SG	and	1PL.ACC/DAT?	measure.out-IPV.ACT.2DU	containing.vigour-DAT.SG

The verb is included in Delbrück’s (1888:141) list of verbs taking the dative, and is given the meaning ‘zumessen’, but it is not awfully clear whether we are dealing with a RECIPIENT dative in this case. Again, the *naḥ* is ambigious. Griffith translates this passage as: ’prepare ye us for opulence with strengthening food’, and Geldner says ’bestimmt uns für den lohnbringenden Reichtum’. As these translations indicate, we could be dealing with a *naḥ* which is accusative. Indeed, Monier-Williams seem to confirm this when he gives the meaning of the construction in RV 1.120.9 as ‘to help anyone (acc.) to anything (dat.)’. *vā́javatyai* is of course unambiguously dative, and must be understood as a dative of PURPOSE.

The root *ric* means ’to leave’, and used with the dative it means ’to leave something behind (for someone)’(cf. English ’She left £1 million to her daughter’):

(6.8) RV 1.113.16c

āraik	*pánthāṃ*	*yātave*	*sūriyāya*
leave-AOR.3SG	path-ACC.SG	go-INF.DAT	sun-DAT.SG

'she left for the Sun a path to travel'

Here, the darkness (the AGENT or 'donor') has left the scene, placing the world at the sun's (the RECIPIENT or BENEFACTIVE) disposal. The darkness 'gives way' to the sun (note the English expression). Whether to analyze the dative as RECIPIENT or BENEFACTIVE makes little difference, I think. The fact that the subject leaves the scene makes it different from other acts of giving where we may not necessarily know where the subject goes after handing over the gift. We could emphasize this act of leaving as something that is done to the benefit of the dative argument, and therefore analyze the dative as a benefactive (compare this to acts of giving where it is the gift rather than the action that is to the benefit of the dative argument, though the giving is necessary for the gift to come to the disposal of the recipient). Or we could emphasize the fact that the 'gift', in this case the path left behind by the darkness, is now for the sun to use, and therefore analyze the sun as the RECIPIENT.

Other verbs of 'giving' in the Ṛgveda which take recipient datives are: *maṃh* (e.g. RV 10.62.8) and *rā* (e.g. RV 1.114.6).

I have not found many examples of alternative cases used to express the RECIPIENT thematic role. This could be an indication that the dative is well established as the recipient role case, and that the RECIPIENT function is the most central use of the dative case (cf. how the RECIPIENT function is placed in the centre of the semantic map). Still, let us look at some examples with other cases which may compare to the dative as recipient.

We saw in example 6.2 above that the verb *yam*, literally 'extend' could be used in the sense of 'giving'. The verb *vi-yam* basically has the same meaning (cf. Monier-Williams). In the Ṛgveda there are two passages with *vi-yam* which could possibly be parallel (Hopkins 1906:94):

(6.9) RV 1.85.12

yā	*[...]*	*śárma*	*[...]*	*asmábhyaṃ*
which-NOM.PL		shelter-NOM.PL		1PL.DAT
tāni	*maruto*	*ví*	*yanta*	*[...]*
ACC.PL	Marut-VOC.PL	PREV	extend-IPV.ACT.2PL	

‘the shelters, extend them to us, Maruts’

(6.10) RV 8.47.10

yád	*[...]*	*śárma*	*[...]*	*tád*	*asmāsu*	*ví*	*yantana*	*[...]*
NOM.SG		shelter-NOM.SG		ACC.SG	1PL.LOC	PREV	extend-AOR.IPV.2PL	

’extend the shelter over us’

In both examples, *śarman* (’protection’) is the direct object (although the number differs), and in both examples the third argument is the first person plural pronoun, but the cases are dative and locative respectively. Do the two passages express the same thing? Or does the dative emphasize recipiency and the locative the extension in space?

6.1.2 Datives with verbs of ’procuring’

Verbs of ’procuring’ or ’getting’ express the opposite of ‘giving’, but when occurring with a dative argument, the meaning could often be that of ‘giving’. That is, one obtains something in order to give it to someone:

(6.11) RV 1.62.3b

vidát	*sarámā*	*tánayāya*	*dhāsím*
find-INJ.3SG	Saramā-NOM.SG	offspring-DAT.SG	nourishment-ACC.SG

‘Saramā found provision for her offspring’

vid literally means ’to find’, and in this situation Indra’s heavenly bitch, Saramā (the ‘finder’, the AGENT), finds refreshments (the ‘thing sought’, the THEME), with the understanding that she later gave them (or were supposed to give them) to her children. But since the act of giving is not implied by the verb, should we label *tánayāya* RECIPIENT or simply BENEFACTIVE? I suggest that we label it $\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{procure}}$, but place it closer to the ’benefactive’ end of the ’recipient’ category. The construction is close to that of verbs of ’giving’ in that the object is a THEME, and not an action or an object which comes about through the action specified by the verb.

	predicative possessor		external possessor
direction	$\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{give}}$	**$\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{procure}}$**	benefactive
purpose	experiencer		

Semantic map 6.2

The root *jan* 'give birth' is also used in the sense of 'bringing forth':

(6.12) RV 10.11.3c-d

agníṃ	*hótāraṃ*	*vidáthāya*	*jījanan*
Agni-ACC.SG	sacrificer-ACC.SG	assembly-DAT.SG	bring.forth-INJ.3PL

'they brought forth Agni as the sacrificer for the assembly'

Someone brings Agni (the THEME) forth to the assembly (the RECIPIENT). This example is perhaps more 'local' than most verbs of giving - Agni turns up in a place he was not before, or appears to someone who did not see him before. At the same time, the assembly is also benefactive – Agni has been brought forth there for their sake.

6.1.3 Datives with verbs of 'making subject to'

The root *radh* also has the sense 'to give', but the THEME is a person rather than a thing:

(6.13) RV 1.50.13c

dviṣántam	*máhyaṃ*	*randháyan*
enemy-ACC.SG	1SG.DAT	be.subject-CAUS.PRS.PTC.NOM.M.3SG

'giving my enemy over to me'

The THEME is usually an enemy captured in war, who is given over to the victor or the victor's leader (the RECIPIENT). Someone is made the subject of someone else. In Grassmann this construction is rendered as 'jemand (Akk.) einer Person (Dat.) überliefern'.

The verb *van* is also used in the sense of 'winning (someone) over to (someone)':

(6.14) RV 6.18.3b

ékaḥ	*kṛṣṭīr*	*avanor*	*āriyāya*
one-NOM.SG	people-ACC.PL	win-IPF.ACT.2SG	Aryan-DAT.SG

'alone did you win over the lands for the Aryan'

The new master is the Aryan, and what is being won over is variously translated as 'the people' (Griffith) or 'die Länder' (Geldner). We are here probably talking about a word that may not only refer to a people, but also metonymically to the area which the people occupy.

6.2 Addressee datives

An ADDRESSEE is the participant to whom a 'message' is communicated. It is communicated by a 'speaker'. The type of process associated with an ADDRESSEE is verbal processes, which could be analyzed as a form of transfer, just like processes of giving, except what is being given is not a 'gift', but rather a 'message' (cf. Delbeque and Lamiroy 1996:92). It could also be analyzed as a causative cognition process (not in Van Valin and LaPolla 1997), that is, to cause someone to have knowledge about something.

6.2.1 Datives with verbs of 'speaking'

Next, verbs of 'speaking', for instance *brū*:

(6.15) RV 10.65.5c

pra	*bruvāṇā*	*váruṇāya*	*dāśúṣe*
PREV	speak-PRS.MED.PTC.NOM.PL	Váruṇa-DAT.SG	serving-DAT.SG

'proclaiming to Váruṇa and the worshipper'

Here, someone (a 'speaker') says something (a 'message', not specified) to a listener (the ADDRESSEE). There is no exchange of goods, only exchange of words. As noted, no language (according to Haspelmath) has a separate 'addressee' case or adposition from that of 'recipient'. This is also evident in the metaphors used in relation to 'speaking', such as *'give* a speech' or '*receive* a word that someting has happened' or the term 'addressee',

which usually denotes someone to whom a letter is addressed. A letter, by the way, (or any other text), is speech petrified and in goods' form, ready to be sent around.

We will place ADDRESSEE$_{speak}$ closer to the 'benefactive' end of the 'recipient/addressee' category rather than the 'direction' end, since 'speaking' to a lesser degree than 'giving' involves movement in space, especially in Vedic times where vocal communication could not reach that far (though magic, including long-distance voice transmission, is not unheard of in classical Sanskrit texts).

	predicative possessor		external possessor
direction	RECIPIENT$_{give}$	RECIPIENT$_{procure}$	benefactive
		ADDRESSEE$_{speak}$	
purpose	experiencer		

Semantic map 6.3

Note also that ADDRESSEE$_{speak}$ is closer to 'experiencer' than 'possessor', since the addressee, hearing the speech, is also an experiencer.

Another verb of 'speaking' with an addressee dative is *vac* (e.g. RV 2.21.2).

A common alternative to the NOM-ACC-DAT-construction is a NOM-ACC-INS-construction. In this construction the addressee is expressed with the accusative rather than the dative, and the message with an instrumental rather than an accusative:

(6.16) RV 2.30.11b

úpa	*bruve*	*námasā*	*daívyaṃ*	*jánam*
PREV	speak-PRS.MED.1SG	bow-INS.SG	divine-ACC.SG	person-ACC.SG

'I address with homage this heavenly being'

One of the purposes for a language to have the possibility of such variations is to give prominence to certain participants in a situation. In English there is a kind of alternation that is quite parallel to the NOM-ACC-DAT- and NOM-ACC-INS-constructions in Sanskrit. In English, in describing the same scene, we could say either: 'I sprayed paint onto the wall.' (cf. NOM-ACC-DAT) or 'I sprayed the wall with paint.' (cf. NOM-ACC-INS). We see that the verb 'spray' does not specify whether the object should be the instrument we use or the surface onto

which we apply our spray. The choice of object is a matter of *construal*. We also see that the third participant in these two sentences, the participants introduced by prepositions, require a complement of a more specific kind, we cannot swap the complements and say 'I sprayed wall onto the paint' or 'I sprayed the paint with wall'. The choice of complement in a prepositional phrase is to a lesser degree a matter of construal. In the next chapter we will look at causal order as a possible way explain what motivates the use of specific adpositions/cases.

Yet another way to present a verbal process is by using a double accusative construction where both the message and the addressee are expressed with an accusative:

(6.17) RV 10.80.7b

agním	*mahām*	*avocāmā*	*suvṛktím*
agni-ACC.SG	great-ACC.SG	speak-AOR.ACT.1PL	good.hymn-ACC.SG

'we have declared to Agni a great hymn'

6.2.2 Datives with verbs of 'singing' and 'praising'

A similar construction is found with verbs of 'singing' and 'praising' as with verbs of 'speaking'. The difference lies in the manner of communication. A song or a hymn is highly structured in that it may have a rigid metre, and it is also recited rather than spoken.

(6.18) RV 1.62.1d

árcāma	*arkáṃ*	*náre*	*víśrutāya*
praise-PRS.ACT.1PL	hymn-ACC.SG	man-DAT.SG	famous-DAT.SG

'we will sing a song of praise to the well-known man'

Here the 'text' is denoted by a cognate object: someone (the 'singer', AGENT) sings (*arc*) a song of praise (*arká*) to a listener (an ADDRESSEE). I see no way to locate this type of addressee differently from $\text{ADDRESSEE}_{\text{speak}}$ in the semantic map, so I will put them together (marked by '/'):

	predicative possessor		external possessor
direction	$\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{give}}$	$\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{procure}}$	benefactive
		$\text{ADDRESSEE}_{\text{speak}}$ /	
		$\text{ADDRESSEE}_{\text{sing}}$	
purpose	experiencer		

Semantic map 6.4

(Later, we will refer to this simply as ADDRESSEE)

Other similar verbs with addressee datives are: *gā* (e.g. RV 1.37.4), *śaṃs* (e.g. RV 1.10.5), and *stu* (e.g. RV 10.65.4).

As with verbs of 'speaking', verbs of 'singing' and 'praising' can by expressed through an alternative construction where the song or praise is expressed with an instrumental and the addressee with an accusative:

(6.19) RV 6.22.1b

índraṃ	*táṃ*	*gīrbhír*	*abhí*	*arca*	*ābhíḥ*
Indra-ACC.SG	that-ACC.SG	song-INS.PL	PREV	praise-PRS.MED.1SG	this-INS.PL

'with these songs I praise Indra'

To this Hopkins (1906:101) notes that words meaning 'praise' or 'sing' take the dative or the accusative in the earlier language, but regularly the accusative in the later language.

6.2.3 Datives with verbs of 'pardoning'

The root *kṣam* also takes a dative when the meaning is 'to pardon':

(6.20) RV 2.28.3d

naḥ	*[...]*	*abhí*	*kṣamadhvaṃ*	*yújiyāya*	*devāḥ*
1PL.DAT		PREV	pardon-IPV.ACT.2PL	union-DAT.SG	god-VOC.PL

'pardon us, Gods, (admit us) to your friendship'

naḥ of course is ambiguous as to whether it is accusative, dative or genitive. If a pardon is verbal, so that it is a kind of performative, whereby the pardon is effected by the very utterance of the words of pardoning, then we can view *naḥ* as a kind of ADDRESSEE. But note also how in some languages, such as English, words related to 'pardoning' are based on the language of 'giving': *forgiveness*, *grant a pardon*. The word 'pardon' is also based on *don-*, the Latin root for 'give'. If I have to make a choice, however, I will label this type of dative ADDRESSEE$_{pardon}$, and place it together with the other addressees on the map.

There is however one unambiguous dative in this example, *yújyāya*, but I take this dative not to be governed by the verb. I analyze it as a dative of PURPOSE, that is '(pardon us) for the sake of your friendship'.

6.3 Benefactive datives

A BENEFACTIVE is a participant benefitting from an action. The type of process could be any type of activity.

Just because a participant benefits from an event, this participant is not necessarily regarded as a BENEFACTIVE. It has to be expressed morphosyntactically, not lexically. Thus, in the sentence *We luckily arrived in time*, 'we' is not BENEFACTIVE, no matter how favourable the situation is for us (Smith 2010:73). The morphosyntactic means to express the BENEFACTIVE in Sanskrit is through the dative. The BENEFACTIVE is also not an obligatorily expressed participant (unlike the RECIPIENT) – it is neither agent nor patient. It is also typically animate (Kittilä and Zúñiga 2010:2).

6.3.1 Datives with verbs of 'serving' and 'honouring'

This group of verbs include various verbs with benefactive datives, with meanings such as 'serving', 'assisting', and 'honouring', for example *dāś*:

(6.21) RV 2.19.4a-b

só	*apratīni*	*mánave*	*purūṇi*
he-NOM.SG	without-opponents-ACC.PL	man-DAT.SG	much-ACC.PL
índro	*dāśad*	*dāśúṣe*	*[...]*

Indra-NOM.SG serve-PRS.INJ.3SG serving-DAT.SG
'Indra has given many matchless (gifts) to him who worships'

Here, someone honours a god (the BENEFACTIVE) with sacrificial gifts. I will label this type BENEFACTIVE$_{honour}$.

	predicative possessor		external possessor
direction	RECIPIENT$_{give}$	RECIPIENT$_{procure}$	**BENEFACTIVE$_{honour}$**
		ADDRESSEE	
purpose	experiencer		

Semantic map 6.5

The sacrificial gifts may also be expressed with an instrumental rather than an accusative, but note here that the benefactive is still in the dative, so that we have an NOM-INS-DAT construction:

(6.22) RV 4.8.5a-b
té *siyāma* *yé*
he- NOM.PL be-OPT.ACT.1PL who-NOM.PL
agnáye *dadāśúr* *havyádātibhiḥ*
Agni-DAT.SG serve-PFT.ACT.3PL giving.oblations-INS.PL
'may we be the ones who have worshipped Agni by giving oblations'

Sometimes *dāś* is also translated as 'offer':

(6.23) RV 6.3.2b
ṛdhádvārāya *agnáye* *dadāśa*
increasing-wealth-DAT.M.SG Agni-DAT.M.SG serve-PFT.ACT.3SG
'and offered [gifts] to wealth-increasing Agni'

If we compare 'offering' with 'giving', we see that 'offering' does not necessarily imply anyone receiving anything. The offer is presented to someone, in these instances a god, who

may choose to accept the offering or not. The offering is still done with Agni in mind, so we analyze him as the benefactive. The similarities of 'offering' to 'giving' however, encourage us to place BENEFACTIVE$_{offer}$ close to RECIPIENT$_{give}$:

	predicative possessor		external possessor
direction	RECIPIENT$_{give}$	RECIPIENT$_{procure}$	**BENEFACTIVE$_{offer}$**
		ADDRESSEE	BENEFACTIVE$_{honour}$
purpose	experiencer		

Semantic map 6.6

The root *śam*, meaning 'to toil', is used with the dative in the sense of 'toiling for someone' or 'serving someone':

(6.24) RV 8.101.1a-b

[...]	*itthā*	*sá*	*mártiyaḥ*	*śaśamé*	*devátātaye*
	thus.IND	the-NOM.SG	mortal-NOM.SG	toil-PFT.MED.3SG	deity-DAT.SG

'so did the mortal serve the deity'

I will label this type of dative BENEFACTIVE$_{serve}$, and place it together with BENEFACTIVE$_{honour}$:

	predicative possessor		external possessor
direction	RECIPIENT$_{give}$	RECIPIENT$_{procure}$	BENEFACTIVE$_{offer}$
		ADDRESSEE	BENEFACTIVE$_{honour}$/
			BENEFACTIVE$_{serve}$
purpose	experiencer		

Semantic map 6.7

(from now on I will only use the label BENEFACTIVE$_{honour}$ on the map, in order not to bloat it)

It is not always the case that the dative expresses the argument who benefits from an action, but rather an argument who is adversely affected by an action, the so-called

MALEFACTIVE function. It is quite common for languages to use the same marker for BENEFACTIVE as well as MALEFACTIVE, but there are languages that do mark these functions differently. For instance, Finnish uses allative for BENEFACTIVE and ablative for MALEFACTIVE (Kittilä and Zúñiga 2010:5). In Sanskrit the dative is used:

(6.25) RV 1.25.6b-c

[...]	*ná*	*prá*	*yuchataḥ*	*dhṛtávratāya*	*dāśúṣe*
	not	PREV	separate-PRS.ACT.3DU	fixed-law-DAT.SG	serving-DAT.SG

'they do not fail the faithful worshipper'

Of course, here the observant reader might want to protest – the sentence is negated, and is not therefore the 'malefactive' instead a BENEFACTIVE? Whatever we want to label this dative, I will place the MALEFACTIVE together with the BENEFACTIVE on the map[11].

Another way of honouring someone, is to do the reverential bow:

(6.26) RV 1.114.2b

kṣayádvīrāya	*námasā*	*vidhema*	*te*
ruling-man-DAT.SG	bow-INS.SG	honour-OPT.ACT.1PL	you-DAT?

'you, Ruler of Men, will we honour with reverence'

Here, the bow itself is construed as an instrument, but it could also be construed as an action (for which I am going to create a new section):

6.3.2 Datives with verbs of 'bowing'

(6.27) RV 1.131.1a

índrāya	*hí*	*dyaúr*	*ásuro*	*ánamnata*
Indra-DAT.SG	for	sky-NOM.SG	asura-NOM.SG	bow-INT.IPF.MED.3SG

'for to Indra did Dyaus the Asura bow down'

[11] and just refer to them as 'benefactives', since my example maybe isn't a good enough example of a 'malefactive'.

In both of the preceding examples however the intended receiver of the act of reverence is expressed through the dative. Someone (an AGENT) does something (for example, bend his body) to honour someone (the 'honouree'). We could perhaps equally well call the 'honouree' either 'addressee' or 'benefactive', but let us reserve 'addressee' for verbal situations (the bow could be accompanied by something verbal, but it is the bending which is encoded by the verb, if we take it literally). Anyway, we place $\text{BENEFACTIVE}_{\text{bow}}$ close to ADDRESSEE:

	predicative possessor		external possessor
direction	$\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{give}}$	$\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{procure}}$	$\text{BENEFACTIVE}_{\text{offer}}$
			$\text{BENEFACTIVE}_{\text{honour}}$
		ADDRESSEE	**$\text{BENEFACTIVE}_{\text{bow}}$**
purpose	experiencer		

Semantic map 6.8

An act of bowing can also be expressed with just a noun, it too taking the dative:

(6.28) RV 1.27.13a

námo	*mahádbhyo*	*námo*	*arbhakébhyo*
bow-NOM.SG	great-DAT.PL	bow-NOM.SG	small-DAT.PL

'obeisance to the great, obeisance to the small'

The verb *ni-hā* 'bow down' also takes the dative:

(6.29) RV 5.32.10a

ní	*asmai*	*devī*	*svádhitir*	*jihīta*
PREV	this-DAT.M.SG	divine-NOM.SG	axe-NOM.SG	descend-PRS.MED.3SG

'the Heavenly Axe bows down before him'

6.3.3 Other benefactive datives

As mentioned in the beginning of this section (6.3), any type of activity verb can occur with the dative, the meaning of this dative will then be 'the one for whose benefit the action is done'. It will suffice to cite a couple of examples.

For example, something can be made for the benefit of someone else:

(6.30) RV 1.61.6a

asmā	*íd*	*u*	*tváṣṭā*	*takṣad*	*vájraṃ*
this-DAT.SG	PART	PART	Tváṣṭar-NOM	form-INJ.ACT.2SG	club-ACC.SG

'for him did Tváṣṭar make the club'

This dative is a BENEFACTIVE, though the person in question might also be the RECIPIENT of the thunderbolt.

Someone can also do something for someone else:

(6.31) RV 1.113.18b

viuchánti	*dāśúṣe*	*mártiyāya*
V	serving-DAT.SG	mortal-DAT.SG

'[the dawns] shining upon he who sacrifices'

We can label these two datives as examples of $\text{BENEFACTIVE}_{\text{do}}$, the most general type of benefactive.

6.4 Direction and goal datives

A GOAL participant expresses a location to which something (a THEME) moves. It occurs in processes involving some sort of (non-static) motion. These kinds of processes can also be analyzed as causative location processes (cf. Van Valin and LaPolla 1997:126-7), that is, to cause a THEME to be in a different location (the GOAL) than where it previously was (the SOURCE).

6.4.1 Datives with verbs of 'throwing'

The verb *as* 'throw' takes what appears to be a goal dative:

(6.32) RV 3.30.17d

brahmadvíṣe	*tápuṣiṃ*	*hetím*	*asya*
brahman-hostile-DAT.SG	burning-ACC.SG	missile-ACC.SG	throw-IPV.ACT.2SG

'throw your burning missile at the enemy of the sacred word'

Someone (the AGENT) throws a dart (the THEME) at a target (the GOAL). The spatial aspect of this situation is obvious: something flies through the air, but whether to interpret the nasty demons as a goal is not obvious, especially since the dative is not the preferred case to use in a directional sense according to some (cf. Speijer 1886:58). It could be the case that this is a dative of purpose, so that 'He throws the weapon aiming at (i.e. in order to hit) the Rakṣasas' (we do not know whether he actually hit them (this could be a possible difference in the dative/locative alternation, that is, reaching the target or not). Both interpretations are possible, so we place $\text{DIRECTION}_{\text{throw}}$ close to 'purpose':

<table>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td colspan="2">predicative possessor</td><td>external possessor</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>$\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{give}}$</td><td>$\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{procure}}$</td><td>$\text{BENEFACTIVE}_{\text{offer}}$</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td rowspan="2">$\text{DIRECTION}_{\text{throw}}$</td><td rowspan="2"></td><td rowspan="2"></td><td>$\text{BENEFACTIVE}_{\text{honour}}$</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>ADDRESSEE</td><td>$\text{BENEFACTIVE}_{\text{bow}}$</td></tr>
<tr><td>purpose</td><td></td><td colspan="2">experiencer</td><td></td></tr>
</table>

Semantic map 6.9

Another verb for 'throwing', *sṛj*, also seems to take a goal argument in the dative:

(6.33) RV 1.71.5c

sṛjád	*ástā*	*dhṛṣatā*	*didyúm*	*asmai*
throw-INJ.ACT.3SG	thrower-NOM.SG	boldly-IND	arrow-ACC.SG	he-DAT.SG

'the archer boldly shot his arrow at him'

About dative as GOAL, Haudry (1977:253) says that it appears that it is a substitute for an accusative allative. So even if he regards the accusative as the normal way to express goal, he nevertheless thinks that this very example should be regarded as an allative, i.e. a goal, and not (primarily) a benefactive/malefactive or purpose dative.

As just mentioned, the GOAL could also be (or is normally?) expressed with an accusative. In that case, the THEME is an instrumental rather than an accusative. Look at the following example (the verb is *iṣ*, which also means 'to throw'):

(6.34) RV 1.63.2

[...]	*vájraṃ*	*[...]*	*yénā*	*[...]*
	club-ACC.SG		which-INS.SG	
amítrān		*[...]*	*iṣṇāsi*	*[...]*
not-friend-ACC.PL			throw-PRS.ACT.2SG	

'the club you use to throw at your enemies'

Yet another alternative is a double object construction:

(6.35) RV 1.121.10b

tám	*adrivaḥ*	*phaligáṃ*	*hetím*	*asya*
that-ACC.SG	stone-having-VOC.SG	cask-ACC.SG	missile-ACC.SG	throw-IPV.ACT.2SG

'Lord of the pressing stone, throw your missile at the cask (=the cloud)'

Hopkins (1906:87) spends quite some time discussing the dative as an indicator of GOAL. He says that it is often said that the dative in Vedic is primarily without directive sense, so that the sentence:

(6.36) RV 1.117.2d

[...]	*vartír*	*asmábhyaṃ*	*yātam*
	abode-ACC.N	1PL.DAT	go-IPV.ACT.2DU

is to be read not as 'come the way *to* us', as a directive sense would suggest, but rather 'come the way *for* us', that is, in a benefactive sense, since the author is asking the gods to come for help (ibid. 89). As we have already mentioned, it is true that the destination is more commonly expressed with the accusative (Speijer 1886:58). But Hopkins disputes this benefactive interpretation. He argues that when one invites the gods to come to the sacrifice,

‘sacrifice’ also refers to the *place* of the sacrifice (Hopkins 1906:89). He also refers to Whitney who rejects Delbrück’s interpretation, that the dative in question is a BENEFACTIVE, as going against the principles of syntactic development, because one finds the dative being used as a terminative (i.e. GOAL) case both in Classical Sanskrit and Pāli (ibid. 87). If Delbrück is right then, the terminative sense should have arisen out of the benefactive sense, that is, a concrete spatial use out of a more abstract metaphorical use. In the following verse,

(6.37) RV 10.58.2c-d

[...]	*ā*	*vartayāmasi*	*ihá*	*kṣáyāya*	*jīváse*
	PREV	turn-CAUS.ACT.1PL	here	house-DAT.M	live-INF.DAT

‘We turn here to the house, to live.’

the directive sense is clearly emphasized by both the preverb *ā́* ‘to’ and the adverb *ihá* ‘here’ (Hopkins 1906:97). I want to concur with Hopkins in this dispute.

6.4.2 Datives with verbs of ’bringing’ and ’sending’

There are several verbs in this category, for instance *bhṛ*:

(6.38) RV 2.14.1a

ádhvaryavo	*bhárat’*	*éndrāya*	*sómam*
ádhvaryu-VOC.PL	carry-IPV.ACT.2PL	Indra-DAT.SG	soma-ACC.SG

‘ádhvaryus, bring the soma to Indra’

Here, someone (the AGENTS) brings a certain beverage (the THEME), to someone who can be viewed as a RECIPIENT. But what makes ’bringing’ different from ’giving’ is that the RECIPIENT usually is located in a different place from where the AGENTS initially are, so that a certain path has to be traversed in order to reach the RECIPIENT. If we take the view that GOALS refer to locations, while RECIPIENTS are sentient, we would call the dative-marked argument in this example $\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{bring}}$, rather than $\text{GOAL}_{\text{bring}}$, though both RECIPIENT and GOAL are in the same place and the spatial aspect of ’bringing’ is important. Therefore we place $\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{bring}}$ close to ’direction’.

		predicative possessor		external possessor
	RECIPIENT$_{\textbf{bring}}$	RECIPIENT$_{\text{give}}$	RECIPIENT$_{\text{procure}}$	BENEFACTIVE$_{\text{offer}}$
	DIRECTION$_{\text{throw}}$			BENEFACTIVE$_{\text{honour}}$
			ADDRESSEE	BENEFACTIVE$_{\text{bow}}$
purpose		experiencer		

Semantic map 6.10

Sometimes the opposite of something moving in the direction of someone is expressed with a construction involving the dative. In the following example, a wish is expressed that someone should move away from the dative-marked participant:

(6.39) RV 10.87.18b

ā	*vṛścyantām*	*áditaye*	*durévāḥ*
PREV	cut.off-IPV.MED.3PL	Áditi-DAT.SG	evil.doer-NOM.PL

'may the evildoers be separated from Áditi'

I do not know whether this should be interpreted as a kind of 'ablative'-like dative. One might instead suggest that Áditi is the one who is to benefit from the evildoers going away. If this really is to be taken as an example of a dative of 'separation' it is in any case an example of a rather marginal use of the dative, though using the same case to mark opposing concepts is not unheard of (as in the example of BENEFACTIVE/MALEFACTIVE above).

6.4.3 Datives with verbs of 'spreading'

Sentences with verbs meaning 'to spread' might provide us with more examples of datives with a locative or directive sense:

(6.40) RV 1.162.16a

yád	*aśvāya*	*vāsa*	*upa*	*stṛṇánti*
which-ACC.SG	horse-DAT.SG	robe-ACC.SG	PREV	spread-PRS.ACT.3PL

'the robe which they spread upon the horse'

The dative here is a location or an area on which the robe (the THEME) is spread. I would argue that the horse is not simply the RECIPIENT or BENEFACTIVE. We will call this $\text{DIRECTION}_{\text{spread}}$ (or $\text{GOAL}_{\text{spread}}$):

		predicative possessor		external possessor
	$\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{bring}}$	$\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{give}}$	$\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{procure}}$	$\text{BENEFACTIVE}_{\text{offer}}$
$\text{DIRECTION}_{\text{spread}}$	$\text{DIRECTION}_{\text{throw}}$			$\text{BENEFACTIVE}_{\text{honour}}$
			ADDRESSEE	$\text{BENEFACTIVE}_{\text{bow}}$
purpose		experiencer		

Semantic map 6.11

A similar example might be found in the following passage:

(6.41) RV 10.10.10c

úpa	*barbṛhi*	*vṛṣabhāya*	*bāhúm*
PREV	press-IPV.ACT.2SG	bull-DAT.SG	arm-ACC.SG

'press your arm closely around your bull (=husband)'

6.5 Datives of purpose

The PURPOSE expresses the intention with which something is done. Datives of purpose are quite numerous in the Ṛgveda. They are also referred to as 'final' datives.

They occur with activity predicates (doing something for the sake of something), as well as state predicates (being for the sake of something), as in the following example:

(6.42) RV 1.108.2c

tāvāṃ	*ayám*	*pā́tave*	*sómo*	*astu*
so.great-NOM.SG	this-NOM.SG	drink-INF.DAT	soma-NOM.SG	be-IPV.ACT.3SG

'so great let this soma be for your drinking'

The soma is offered in order that the addressee may drink it.

6.5.1 Datives of purpose with *mánas*

Sometimes constructions with *mánas* (’mind’) as object take a dative complement expressing finality:

(6.43) RV 1.48.4a-b

[...]	*yuñjáte*	*máno*	*dānāya*	*sūráya*
	yoke-PRS.MED.3PL	mind-ACC.SG	giving-DAT.SG	sage-NOM.PL

‘the sages who put their minds to giving’

Someone directs (literally ’yokes’) their minds upon an action (the PURPOSE), that is, decides to do something (compare the English expression, where we also say that we ‘put our minds to’ something). This type of construction is common in Sanskrit although the choice of verb varies; according to Monier-Williams the following verbs may be used: *kṛ* (in the sense ’place’), *dhā* (’put’), *dhṛ* (’fix’), *bandh* (’bind’), *ni-viś* (’settle’). Here is another example from the Rgveda made with *kṛ*:

(6.44) RV 1.54.9d

áthā	*máno*	*vasudéyāya*	*kṛṣva*
then	mind-ACC.SG	wealth-giving-DAT.SG	place-IPV.MED.2SG

‘then put your mind to giving wealth’

Datives of purpose commonly refer to actions, rather than people (like ’recipient’ and ’benefactive’) or places (like ’direction’), and are for that reason often easy to categorize as datives of ’purpose’. But we saw in the above example of throwing, that the dative-marked argument could be understood as a dative of purpose: ’with the aim of (hitting) the target’, though ’hitting’ is nowhere mentioned in the sentence, and that is maybe why I hesitate to classify a dative argument that does not refer to an action as a dative of purpose. We will call this kind of dative simply PURPOSE:

		predicative possessor		external possessor
	$RECIPIENT_{bring}$	$RECIPIENT_{give}$	$RECIPIENT_{procure}$	$BENEFACTIVE_{offer}$
$DIRECTION_{spread}$	$DIRECTION_{throw}$			$BENEFACTIVE_{honour}$
			ADDRESSEE	$BENEFACTIVE_{bow}$
PURPOSE		experiencer		

Semantic map 6.12

Sometimes a dative of purpose complements a noun:

(6.45) RV 1.72.9b

kṛṇvānāso	*amṛtatvāya*	*gātúm*
make-PRS.MED.PTC.NOM.M.PL	immortality-DAT.SG	path-ACC.SG

'making a path to immortality'

6.6 Experiencer datives

An EXPERIENCER is a participant perceiving a STIMULUS or experiencing a psychological state. It is commonly expressed with the dative in Sanskrit.

6.6.1 Datives with verbs of 'pleasing'

The verb *svad* means to be sweet or pleasant:

(6.46) RV 9.74.9d

svádasv'	*éndrāya*	*pavamāna*	*pītáye*
be.sweet-IPV.MED.2SG	Indra-DAT.SG	being.purified-VOC.SG	drinking-DAT.SG

'Pavamāna, be sweet to drink for Indra'

The one who experiences the sweetness or the pleasantness (the EXPERIENCER) is expressed with the dative, but since this sentence is an imperative, encouraging someone to be sweet for Indra, we may not actually know how Indra feels about this, if he ever gets to experience the

results of this growing sweet. We may therefore analyze the dative as a purpose instead: grow sweet in order to please Indra. Here we see that the function a dative plays (or our interpretation of it) depends not just upon the type of process, but also on the illocutionary force (or mood) of that process.

The above sentence also has a second dative *pītáye*, which is a PURPOSE dative.

The adjective *cāru* also means to be 'pleasant' or 'agreeable'. It is also complemented by a dative:

(6.47) RV 2.2.8d

rājā	*viśām*	*átithiś*	*cārur*	*āyáve*
king-NOM.SG	people-GEN.PL	guest-NOM.SG	agreeable-NOM.SG	living.being-DAT.SG

'king of the people, a good guest to a living man'

The guest (the STIMULUS) is agreeable to a living being (the EXPERIENCER).

Sometimes the verb (*as* 'to be') is also present in the sentence:

(6.48) RV 10.34.2b

śivā	*sákhibhya*	*utá*	*máhyam*	*āsīt*
gracious-NOM.SG	friend-DAT.PL	and	I-DAT.SG	be-IPF.ACT.3SG

'she was gracious to my friends and to me'

I will call this type of dative EXPERIENCER$_{please}$:

		predicative possessor		external possessor
	RECIPIENT$_{bring}$	RECIPIENT$_{give}$	RECIPIENT$_{procure}$	BENEFACTIVE$_{offer}$
DIRECTION$_{spread}$	DIRECTION$_{throw}$			BENEFACTIVE$_{honour}$
			ADDRESSEE	BENEFACTIVE$_{bow}$
PURPOSE		**EXPERIENCER$_{please}$**		

Semantic map 6.13

It is not only verbs and nouns that are complemented by a dative. An indeclinable word can take a dative as well:

(6.49) RV 1.114.1c

yáthā	*śám*	*ásad*	*dvipáde*	*cátuṣpade*
so.that-IND	well-IND	be-SUBJ.ACT.3SG	biped-DAT.SG	quatruped-DAT.SG

'so that all be well with cattle and men'

Here it is the indeclinable *śám* which governs the two experiencer datives, *dvipáde* and *cátuṣpade.*

6.6.2 Datives with verbs of 'showing'

apa-ā-vṛ means to 'uncover' and takes a dative:

(6.50) RV 2.11.18c

áp'	*"*	*âvṛṇor*	*jyótir*	*āriyāya*
PREV	[PREV: ā]	cover-IPF.ACT.2SG	light-ACC.SG	aryan-DAT.SG

'you have revealed the light to the Aryan'

Someone (the 'discloser') discloses the light to the *ārya* (the 'perceiver'). We could view the *ārya* as an EXPERIENCER since he sees the light, but he is also a BENEFACTIVE – it was for him the light was disclosed. But there is another thing that separates this particular EXPERIENCER dative (if we choose to view it as such) from the ones we looked at above. It is participating in a three-place construction as opposed to the two-place constructions above. This makes it somewhat parallel to the three-place constructions with verbs of 'giving', 'speaking' and 'singing'. One way to view it is that all these constructions involve a transmission of some sort – verbal in the case of 'speaking', auditory in the case of 'singing', physical in the case of 'giving', and 'visual' in the case of 'revealing' or 'showing' (compare how in English another way of expressing that you reveal something, especially a secret, is to 'give it away'). How one construction, in this case the NOM-ACC-DAT-construction can readily be used across various domains will be one of the topics discussed in the next chapter.

6.6.3 Datives with verbs of 'judging'

(6.51) RV 7.97.2c

yáthā	*bhávema*	*mīḷhúṣe*	*ánāgā*
so.that-IND	be-OPT.ACT.1PL	generous-DAT.SG	no-sin-NOM.PL

'so that the Generous One may find us sinless'

A more literal translation would be 'so that we may be sinless to the Generous One'.

6.7 Stimulus datives

A STIMULUS is a participant who is the object of perception, cognition or emotion. In Sanskrit it is in some cases the STIMULUS that is marked with the dative rather than the EXPERIENCER.

6.7.1 Datives with verbs of 'listening'

As mentioned earlier, an ADDRESSEE of a verb of 'speaking' could also be an EXPERIENCER (provided that the ADDRESSEE actually perceive that something is being said to him). What is strange is that a situation of 'listening' could be construed not just with the 'listener' in dative, but also with what is being heard (the 'stimulus') in that dative instead. It is perhaps not so strange if we think of listening as somehow directed: someone listens *to* something (again the metaphors are not incidental). It is this directionality which differentiates the English verb *listen* from *hear*, and likewise *watch* from *see* (in Norwegian this is more evident, since the equivalent verbs may be based on the same root, but require an additional preposition: *høre* ('hear') / *høre på* ('listen'), and *se* ('see') / *se på* ('watch/look at'), the preposition *på* ('on/at') suggesting somehow contact between the perceiver and the stimulus, and therefore directionality.

(6.52) RV 3.33.9a

ó	*ṣú*	*svasāraḥ*	*kāráve*	*śṛṇota*
PART	PART	sister-VOC.F	poet-DAT.M	listen-IPV.ACT.2PL

'Listen to the poet, sisters.'[12]

[12] The meanings of the particles I have gracefully ignored.

The earth (the 'perceiver') listens to someone coming (the 'stimulus'). We will therefore call this type of dative STIMULUS. But, 'stimulus' is not a category on Haspelmath's Dative Map. The reason is probably that it is rather uncommon to use 'dative' markers for this function (though English has *listen to* and Norwegian *lytte til* (but cf. *look at* and *se på*, non-dative prepositions)). But due to the Contiguity Hypothesis, which states that a grammatical marker should cover a contiguous space on the semantic map, the 'stimulus' function cannot be far off the edges of Haspelmath's map. In view of the directionality of listening, I will place STIMULUS somewhere west on the map, close to 'direction':

		predicative possessor		external possessor
	$\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{bring}}$	$\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{give}}$	$\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{procure}}$	$\text{BENEFACTIVE}_{\text{offer}}$
$\text{DIRECTION}_{\text{spread}}$	$\text{DIRECTION}_{\text{throw}}$			$\text{BENEFACTIVE}_{\text{honour}}$
STIMULUS			ADDRESSEE	$\text{BENEFACTIVE}_{\text{bow}}$
PURPOSE		EXPERIENCER		

Semantic map 6.14

It might very well be that our 'stimulus' reading of this dative is wrong. Instead what we have here could be an instance of a final dative, so that 'The earth listened in order that (she hear) you coming'. But I think this type of construction lends itself well to the directionality of listening, and see that as one probable interpretation. Anyway, a possible STIMULUS/PURPOSE interpretation might speak for their relative proximity on the map.

But there is also another pattern in which the STIMULUS is expressed by the genitive:

(6.53) RV 1.190.1c-d

[...]	*yásya*	*devā*	*āśṛṇvánti*	*návamānasya*	*mártāḥ*
	who-	god-	listen-	praise-	mortal-
	GEN.SG	NOM.PL	PRS.ACT.3PL	PRS.MED.PTC.GEN.SG	NOM.PL

'to whom (praising) gods and mortals listen'

There are quite a few other STIMULUS datives. They occur with verbs that differ from each other semantically. Differing enough in my opinion that they merit to be mentioned here. But I will not put them into different slots in the semantic map, but rather lump the all under

‘stimulus’. Nor will I discuss them thoroughly – I think they all can be viewed as something towards which perception, cognition or emotion is ‘directed’.

6.7.2 Datives with verbs of ’desiring’

The verb *tṛṣ* ’be thirsty’ also take a dative complement:

(6.54) RV 1.31.7c

yás	*tātṛṣāṇá*	*ubháyāya*	*jánmane*
who-NOM.SG	be.thirsty-PFT.MED.PTC.NOM.M.SG	both-DAT.SG	race-DAT.SG

‘(you) who are thirsty for both races’

6.7.3 Datives with verbs of ’being angry’ or ‘being envious’

The one at whom anger is directed is expressed with the dative:

(6.55) RV 7.86.3d

this-NOM.SG indeed 2SG.DAT Varuṇa-NOM.SG be.angry-PRS.MED.3SG

‘This Varuṇa is angry with you.’

As is the target of envy:

(6.56) RV 10.86.3c

yásmā	*irasyás’*	*îd*	*u*	*nú*
who-DAT.SG	be.envious-PRS.ACT.2SG	PART	PART	PART

‘of whom are you so envious?’

6.7.4 Datives with verbs of ’fearing’

The source of fear is expressed with the dative. Or rather, it is construed here as someone having feelings of fear ‘towards’ something:

(6.57) RV 1.80.14c-d

tváṣṭā	*cit*	*táva*	*manyáva*	*índra*	*vevijyáte*	*bhiyā*
Tváṣṭar-	even	2SG.GEN	wrath-	Indra-	tremble-	fear-
NOM.SG			DAT.SG	VOC.SG	INT.ACT.3SG	INS.SG

'O Índra, even Tváṣṭar trembled with fear at your wrath.'

6.7.5 Datives with verbs of 'believing'

The construction *śrád+dhā* 'believe in' also takes the dative:

(6.58) RV 2.12.5d

śrád	*asmai*	*dhatta*	*sá*	*janāsa*	*índraḥ*
heart-	he-	place-	he-	PERSON-	Indra-
IND	DAT.SG	IPV.ACT.2PL	NOM.SG	VOC.PL	NOM.SG

'put your faith in him, people, for he is Indra'

This literally means 'Put [your] heart in him' (compare the English expression 'put one's trust in someone') *śráddhā* is cognate with Latin *credō*, and is therefore quite an old construction.

6.7.6 Datives with verbs of 'remembering'

What is remembered is also put in the dative:

(6.59) RV 1.117.14a

yuvám	*túgrāya*	*pūrviyébhir*	*évaiḥ*	*punarmanyāv*	*abhavataṃ*	*yuvānā*
you-	Túgra-	former-	manner-	again-mind-	be-	young-
DU.NOM	DAT.SG	INS.PL	INS.PL	LOC.SG	IPF.ACT.2DU	VOC.PL

'young ones, you remembered Tugra, according to your ancient manner'

The literal expression is 'to be in again-mind for Tugra'.

6.8 Temporal datives

Lastly, let us look at the only example of a temporal dative I have come across in the Ṛgveda:

(6.60) 6.33.5a

nūnáṃ	*na*	*indra*	*aparāya*	*ca*	*syā*
now-IND	I-GEN.PL	Indra-VOC.SG	later-DAT.SG	and	be-OPT.ACT.2SG

'be ours, Indra, now and for the future'

How are we to understand the use of this dative? If it is based on a spatial metaphor, what is the metaphor behind it? I will not speculate, the expression might have been grammaticalized (and become an indeclinable) already in Ṛgvedic times. We should of course note that in English we say 'for the future' as well.

6.9 Some observations

If we look at the semantic map and reflect upon whether the dative argument is animate or inaminate, we see that most datives are animate and that the inanimate datives are only found towards the left of the map:

	$\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{bring}}$	$\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{give}}$	$\text{RECIPIENT}_{\text{procure}}$	$\text{BENEFACTIVE}_{\text{offer}}$
$\text{DIRECTION}_{\text{spread}}$	$\text{DIRECTION}_{\text{throw}}$			$\text{BENEFACTIVE}_{\text{honour}}$
STIMULUS			ADDRESSEE	$\text{BENEFACTIVE}_{\text{bow}}$
PURPOSE		EXPERIENCER		

Semantic map 6.15

Can we talk about there being a continuum on the map where (from left to right, dark to light) the datives become increasingly animate? Well, benefactives (found on the far-right end of the map) are very likely animate. Consciousness is necessary for someone to judge whether he or she benefits from something. Though it is possible to bow down before a lifeless object, such as a rock, but we would then rather have the rock represent something animate or have it be personified. The image of a deity, immobile as it stands before us, we would have to

regard as animate in this case. The same goes true for the fire, which does move, but has no consciousness, unless regarded as Agni.

7 Domains and causal order

In this chapter we will look at something called the Causal Order Hypothesis. It is not directly related to semantic maps, but has elements that are characteristic of semantic maps, such as implication, and I do think it would be possible to convert the model into a semantic map. One of the main developers of the hypothesis, William Croft, is also an important exponent of the Semantic Map model. If we look at figure 7.3 below, we can see that it has the shape of a map, and we could view this map as an ambitious, but cautious first attempt at charting out the conceptual space for all (non-local) cases, of which Haspelmath's dative map is but a representation of a small portion of this bigger map[13]. I will not attempt to develop this idea further here, instead, the reason I want to look at the Causal Order Hypothesis is that it could shed some light upon what all the various uses of the dative in Sanskrit have in common.

7.1 The Causal Order Hypothesis

The Causal Order Hypothesis is an attempt to explain the relationship between thematic roles and case marking by referring to the position of a participant in the causal chain of an event. A causal chain is a sequence of atomic events where force is transmitted from one participant to another. For example, in the sentence *John broke the boulder for Mary with a hammer* (Croft 1991:166), 'John', a volitional agent causes his hand to grasp the hammer, then moves the hammer into contact with the boulder, causing the boulder to end up broken, Mary then being pleased with this end result (or whatever was the purpose with the breaking of the boulder). Force is transmitted in steps, one event preceding another. The kind of force that is transmitted from the hammer to the boulder is obviously different from the kind of 'force' transmitted to Mary.

What is important for us is the observation that languages seem to organize their case markers around the positioning of participants in the causal chain. The semantic roles AGENT, PATIENT, EXPERIENCER, and STIMULUS, are assigned subject or object status depending on the choice of verb, AGENT and STIMULUS being initiators of an act causation, and PATIENT and EXPERIENCER being the endpoints of a causal chain[14]. The oblique thematic roles are then

[13] For a really ambitious map, see Croft's (2001:88) semantic map for parts of speech.
[14] Although compare the directionality involved in constructions with stimulus datives in section 6.7 above.

described relative to the choice of subject and object (Croft 1991:176). The interesting point is that where there is syncretism of semantic roles, so that one case marker is used for several roles, there seems to be a strong cross-linguistic tendency not to lump together roles that precede and follow the object in the causal chain. Compare the positions of the oblique thematic roles in the following two sentences (ibid. 185)[15]:

(7.1) *Sam baked a cake <u>for Jan</u>.*

Sam		*cake*		*Jan*
·	→	·	→	·
SBJ		OBJ		OBL
###	*bake*	###		

(7.2) *Sam whipped the eggs <u>with a fork</u>.*

Sam		*fork*		*egg*
·	→	·	→	·
SBJ		OBL		OBJ
###		*whip*		###

In the first example, the benefactive Jan, marked by *for*, follows the cake in the causal chain, that is, the cake is first baked, then it is presumably handed over to Jan for her enjoyment. In the second example, the instrument, the fork, marked by *with*, precedes the eggs in the causal chain. Sam is in contact with the fork before it in turn is in contact with the eggs. Owing to their position in the causal chain vis-à-vis the object, the benefactive role is called a *subsequent* role and the instrumental an *antecedent* role (ibid.). In terms of syncretism of thematic roles therefore, there seems to be few cases where, let's say, one marker covers roles covered by the English prepositions *for* and *with*. In fact, in a survey of the case markings of oblique thematic roles in forty languages, there were only two languages in which there was syncretism across the subsequent/antecedent divide. Exceptions of this kind can often be explained by a language having a massive amount of syncretism – in the most extreme cases a language having only one oblique case marker (as in Palauan), or in the case

[15] Notes on notation: (·) signals a participant, (→) signals transmission of force, and (###) delimits a verb segment.

of diachronic evidence, a language apparently entering a process in which the case system is beginning to collapse (as in Attic Greek) (ibid. 188-9).

This is how Croft (1991:186) formulates The Causal Order Hypothesis:

'The grammatical relations hierarchy SBJ < OBJ < $OBL_{subsequent}$ corresponds to the order of participation in the causal chain. (Antecedent oblique case markers are used to indicate that the oblique NP does *not* 'fit' in the causal chain as the hierarchy would imply.)
Subsequent roles: benefactive, recipient, result.
Antecedent roles: instrumental, manner, means, comitative, passive agent, ergative, cause.'



FIGURE 5.1 *Distribution of thematic roles in the causal chain*

Figure 7.3 (Croft 1991:185)

As we can see, the dative is the case marker for subsequent thematic roles in Sanskrit. As for the other cases in Sanskrit, the instrumental covers instrumental, means, manner, comitative and passive agent, and is by far the most important antecedent case marker. The ablative expresses cause.

7.2 Domain: Space

The Causal Order Hypothesis is also used to describe local roles of case markers. This is done by metaphorically transferring the directionality of causation to the domain of space (though there are good reasons to believe that local markers are the ultimate origin of the nonlocal uses of case markers). It is evident that the use of causal order for spatial relations is

metaphorical in cases where there is no causality involved (Croft 1991:193). We can describe the metaphorical relation in the following figure (ibid. 194):



GR stands for Ground, and FIG for Figure. The figure is the object which moves relative to the ground. Ablative marks 'movent *from*', while Allative marks 'movement *to*', corresponding to Cause and Result in the causal domain. We could add that Sanskrit expresses Perlative/Prolative, i.e. 'movement *through*' with instrumental, another antecedent role, corresponding somewhat to means/manner/instrument (cf. English 'achieve success through hard work'). The dative, of course, expresses the 'subsequent' allative role, as in *kṣáyāya*, though the accusative is also common (cf. section 6.4).

7.3 Domain: Possession

The directionality of causation can also be metaphorically transferred to the domain of possession:



The Figure is the thing possessed, while the Ground is the possessor. In cases of causative possession (which is depicted above) where the possessed thing changes hands, both the

DONOR (the old possessor) and the RECIPIENT (the new possessor) are Grounds. Again, in costruing situations in various ways, antecedent and subsequent markers are used (Croft 1991:207): *The dean presented an award to the valedictorian* (subsequent), and *The dean presented the valedictorian with an award* (antecedent). Or put yet another way, using a different verb: *The valedictorian received an award from the dean* (another antecedent marker).

7.4 Domains and the Dative construction as a ditransitive construction

We have seen how a language 'reuses' its markers, be they case markers or adpositions, to express various roles across different domains. One role in one domain has its parallel in a different domain. The markers and roles are not related to each other (across domains) in a random fashion, but seem to be dependent upon whether something is a Figure or a Ground, and where something is positioned in the causal order of things.

We saw in the last chapter how the dative in Sanskrit could express many different roles – RECIPIENT, ADDRESSEE, BENEFACTIVE, etc. Is there a way to unite all of these different uses with reference to domains, Figure-Ground relationship and position in the causal order?

In listing the different uses under headings such as '(dative with verbs of) giving', 'speaking' and 'listening', etc. we have in a way already placed instances of the dative in different domains, but these domains might be narrower than is actually necessary. Let us list anew some of our findings from chapter 6. Many of them fit into the three domains we have talked about in this chapter – the domains of causality, space, and possession.

'Giving' clearly is within the domain of 'possession':

	Ground (antecedent)	Figure	Ground (subsequent)
giving	donor	gift	recipient
	AGENT	THEME	RECIPIENT
	NOM	ACC	DAT

'Throwing' is within the domain of 'space':

	Ground (antecedent)	Figure	Ground (subsequent)
throwing	thrower	missile	target
	AGENT	THEME	GOAL
	NOM	ACC	DAT

'Creating' belongs to the domain of 'causality':

	Ground (antecedent)	Figure	Ground (subsequent)
creating	creator	creation	benefactive
	AGENT	THEME	BENEFACTIVE
	NOM	ACC	DAT

What emerges from these three examples is that they are all constructions with three arguments. The dative is always the ground, more specifically the ground argument subsequent to the figure in the causal order.

Constructions with 'speaking', 'singing', 'bringing' and 'purpose' also follow the same pattern. But not all datives occur in ditransitive constructions as we have seen. This was especially true with constructions involving an EXPERIENCER and a STIMULUS:

	Figure	Ground
pleasing	desirer	desire
	STIMULUS	EXPERIENCER
	NOM	DAT

	Figure	Ground
desiring	desirer	desire
	EXPERIENCER	STIMULUS
	NOM	DAT

The relationship between the thematic role and morphosyntactic expression in these two examples is exactly the opposite: with verbs of 'pleasing' the dative expresses the EXPERIENCER, while the nominative expresses the STIMULUS, and with verbs of 'desiring' the

dative expresses the STIMULUS and the nominative expresses the EXPERIENCER. I argued that this difference could be understood in terms of directionality. This can also be understood in terms of the relationship between the Figure and the Ground. Langacker (2008:365) in fact tries to equate the concept of 'subject' with 'figure'[16] As he says (ibid.): '[figure/ground aligment] is a matter of focal prominence: [figure] and [ground] are the primary and secondary focal participants in a profiled relationship.'

To sum up, the dative in Sanskrit marks the Ground in relation to the Figure, more specifically, the Ground which is positioned subsequent to the Figure in a causal order.

[16] 'trajector' in his parlance. 'Ground' he calls 'landmark'.

8 Variation and diachrony

In chapter 6 we looked at some alternative ways of expressing what could otherwise be expressed with a dative. I did not attempt to give an extensive list of alternative expressions, but from the few examples we looked at there seems to emerge only a few patterns. By far, the case that was used the most instead of the dative was the accusative. This was the case, for instance, with the GOAL of a verb of 'throwing' (RV 1.121.10 (6.35)), and the ADDRESSEE with a verb of 'praising' (RV 6.22.1 (6.19)). As we noted, the THEME, which is expressed as an accusative in the dative construction, is often expressed as an instrumental in the non-dative construction, or occasionally the THEME would still be an accusative and we would have a double accusative construction (as in RV 1.121.1 (6.35)). And if we consider the infinitive to be an alternative way of expressing a dative of PURPOSE, we could note the fact that the infinitive is a grammaticalized accusative form of a verbal noun, for example *kártum* 'to do'. In the Ṛgveda there are also dative infitives, for example *étave* 'to go'. In fact, according to Macdonell (2000:407) the are twelve times as many dative infinitives as accusative infinitives, which may lead us to think that the dative case is indeed the preferred way of expressing PURPOSE in Ṛgvedic.

In one case we saw the a possible alternative to the dative was a locative, in RV 8.47.10 (6.10), although I suggested that there could be a semantic difference between the two expressions – with the dative we got the expression 'extending something to someone (i.e. giving them something), and with the locative we had the expression 'extending something over someone (i.e. spreading something over someone, such as a canvas). Is there a reason why a language should have two alternative expressions between which there is no difference in meaning whatsoever? In the case of the ACC+DAT/ACC+INS alternation the difference might be pragmatic rather than semantic. In the last chapter we saw how a language uses specific markers to indicate whether something is 'figure' or 'ground' to foreground or background certain aspects of a situation, and 'antecendent' and 'subsequent' markers allow a language to rearrange the order in which information is presented without losing track of what precedes what in a causal order. As we know, the dative is a 'subsequent' marker, while the instrumental is an 'antecedent' marker, and therefore the alternative expressions might not be fully equivalent, but rather case alternation is a matter of pragmatics.

This leads us to the question of what happens when a language changes – when other cases seem to take over the role another case once had, like what is happening to the dative as

its use is gradually diminished. If two alternative expressions are not fully equivalent, but a matter of presenting the same scene in two slightly different ways, why should one expression replace the other over time? I will not pursue that question here, but we can note how the dative does not alternate with the instrumental, but rather both cases alternate with the accusative. If we take Croft's figure (repeated below) to be a preliminary semantic map, we can see that the 'instrument' (instrumental) and 'benefactive' (dative) functions are not adjecent to each other on the map, hence the non-alternation. But if the use of a marker only spreads to adjacent areas on the map (as the Semantic Map theory says it should), we can see why the dative and the instrumental could alternate with the accusative (the 'object' marker) – the dative and the instrumental are both close to the accusative on the map, but not to each other.



FIGURE 5.1 *Distribution of thematic roles in the causal chain*

(reproduced from Croft 1991:185)

Here we see how a semantic map can help explain diachronic change. The map is not a representation of some arbitrarily ordered universe, but a representation of a conceptual space rooted in pragmatics and causality.

9 Conclusion

The main aim of my thesis was to test how well suited a semantic map was for describing the use of the dative in the Ṛgveda. Martin Haspelmath (1999) had already made a map for the dative function, so I wanted to test how well his map described the Ṛgvedic state of affairs. The map claimed to be universally valid, and so it should be valid for Sanskrit as well. A map was judged to be valid if all the uses of one grammatical morpheme covered a contiguous area on the map (The Map Connectivity Hypothesis). I classified the various uses of the dative in the Ṛgveda and plotted them onto the map, and in the end they covered a contiguous area on the map, thereby not invalidating the map. In cases where a function was not in included on Haspelmath's map, as was the case with the STIMULUS dative, I suggested adding it at one of the ends of the map, in line with the Connectivity Hypothesis, which says that all functions should be connected. When applying the Dative map to the Sanskrit data I made the map a lot more detailed than Haspelmath's original map, even though the rules of semantic map making does not allow for it. I did this because not only did I want to test a typological universal, but also describe the Sanskrit dative in some detail, and to have a place on the map to place instances of the dative whose function could be interpreted in more than one way. The map is a continuum rather than a natural science class molecular model, so that one function gradually shades into another function, even though semantic maps usually only represent 'pure' functions, as dots on the map, much like cities and other landmarks are represented as dots on a political map, even though we know they have extension, are not always clearly demarcated and are rarely completely circular.

I also tried to look at whether it was possible to find something that bound all the various uses of the dative together. I suggested that the use of the dative could be understood in terms of the relationship between Ground and Figure, where in monotransitive constructions the dative marks the Ground. In ditranstive constructions, where the Figure is set up against two Grounds, I suggested looking at causal order. The dative marks the Ground which is subsequent to the object (i.e. the Figure) in the causal order. Then the language of causality could be metaphorically transferred to other domains.

It was outside the scope of this thesis to look at diachronic development. But semantic maps are fully appropriate for that purpose as well. I did look at some alternative ways of expressing what could otherwise be expressed with the dative in the Ṛgveda. We know that the dative case loses ground in later stages of Sanskrit, and these alternative expressions

could be its hangmen, but often the alternatives were not fully equivalent, semantically or pragmatically. I also suggested that Croft's causal order figure (7.3) could be viewed as a kind of semantic map and be useful in describing the demise of the dative in Sanskrit. But I will leave it with this.

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